

**OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

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**FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2008 SECURITY FORCES FUND**

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**October 2007 Amendment**



**Justification for Amended  
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)**

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## I. O-1 Exhibit

### Iraq Security Forces Fund

(Dollars in Thousands)

		FY 2006/07	FY 2007 Enacted	FY2007 Revised*	Original Request	FY 2008 Changes	FY 2008 Amendment
<b>Ministry of Defense</b>							
01	Infrastructure	751,000	562,800	780,000	0	+298,500	298,500
01	Equipment and Transportation	602,000	1,747,300	1,511,000	1,043,000	-125,100	917,900
01	Training	20,000	61,700	58,000	77,000	+39,100	116,100
01	Sustainment	185,000	1,236,600	1,209,000	135,000	+19,700	154,700
	<b>Ministry of Defense, Subtotal</b>	<b>1,558,000</b>	<b>3,608,400</b>	<b>3,558,000</b>	<b>1,255,000</b>	<b>+232,200</b>	<b>1,487,200</b>
<b>Ministry of Interior</b>							
02	Infrastructure	485,000	332,000	311,000	0	+84,700	84,700
02	Equipment and Transportation	431,000	516,600	583,000	245,000	+147,000	392,000
02	Training	217,000	600,900	552,000	500,000	+123,300	623,300
02	Sustainment	210,000	123,900	127,000	0	+106,000	106,000
	<b>Ministry of Interior, Subtotal</b>	<b>1,343,000</b>	<b>1,573,400</b>	<b>1,573,000</b>	<b>745,000</b>	<b>+461,000</b>	<b>1,206,000</b>
<b>Related Activities</b>							
03	<b>Related Activities, Subtotal</b>	<b>106,000</b>	<b>360,500</b>	<b>411,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>+306,800</b>	<b>306,800</b>
<b>Total Iraq Security Forces Fund</b>		<b>3,007,000</b>	<b>5,542,300</b>	<b>5,542,000</b>	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>+1,000,000</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>

\* Consistent with congressional notification dated June 2006 in FY 2007 ISFF Spend Plan

## II. Overview

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq (GOI), is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve a stable democratic Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development as well as the development of more capable security forces.

This FY 2008 Budget Amendment requests an additional \$1.0 billion over the February 2007 request of \$2.0 billion for increased Iraq Security Force structure including personnel, equipment, training, and facilities for both Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces as well as funding for related activities. U.S. funding would be combined with additional Government of Iraq contributions to fund expansion requirements.

In 2006 and 2007, the GOI, with assistance from the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), has been successful in generating a significant portion of the force structure for the counterinsurgency objective and civil security forces. Many units have become increasingly proficient and the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) has improved its ability to assume a greater share of the responsibility for the security and stability of Iraq. While work remains to be done, the Ministries of Defense and Interior are becoming more proficient institutions who view themselves accountable for the security of their nation.

However, the threats faced by the GOI have proven both resilient and adaptive; independent studies have identified critical gaps in ISF capabilities which hamper the ability of Iraqi Army and Police units to operate effectively. The MNSTC-I has used this information to develop strategies to respond and has shifted funding in accordance with many of the studies' recommendations. In Iraq's dynamic security environment, only a modern and professional ISF, led by competent Ministries, will be capable of successful, independent operations. In addition to the February 2007 / FY 2008 request of \$2.0 billion for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), this amendment requests an additional \$1.0 billion which, in combination with additional GoI contributions, will assist the GoI in bridging the capability gaps -- many of which are currently being satisfied by Coalition Forces. The MNSTC-I plans to focus on four areas to build capacity and professionalize the Iraqi security ministries and their respective forces with the \$3.0 billion, so the Iraqis can assume missions from Coalition forces and eventually enable a troop re-posturing. The areas are:

- A. Support expansion of the Iraqi Army and Police Forces in order to achieve overmatch against the insurgents;
- B. Improve the proficiency and professionalism of all military/police leadership and units through an expanded training base and the assistance of embedded advisors;
- C. Complete logistics and maintenance capabilities of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior at the strategic,

operational and tactical levels;

#### D. Develop ministerial capacity

Numerous independent analytic efforts have been completed since the publication of the May 30, 2007, *In Stride Assessment*, all of which conclude future ISF growth and capability development are required given the future operational environment. However, potential growth of the ISF does not correlate directly to increased ISFF budget requirements. It is the Department's expectation and mission to shift the vast majority of this fiscal burden for new growth in 2008 and beyond to the Government of Iraq.

#### Developments since September 2006

In each of the past 2 years, MNSTC-I conducted an *In-Stride Assessment* of both the current progress of the ISF and resources necessary to build the capabilities required to achieve security self-reliance. Based on an updated Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) Joint Campaign Plan and recent analysis that better articulate ISF requirements, MNSTC-I has crafted this amendment to the previous FY 2008 Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) budget submission to fill and strengthen Iraqi capabilities. This amendment intends to set the conditions which will enable the Government of Iraq to continue assuming the lead in tactical security responsibilities by the end of 2008 and set them on the path to achieving sustainable security. The initial FY 2008 request was based on assumptions that the objective Iraqi Security Force generation would be completed and the Iraqi military would be in transition from a counter-insurgency (COIN) force to a defense force. The original \$2.0 billion request was designed to enhance the capability of the existing forces through modernizing efforts. However, the ISF, while improving, will not have sufficient capability to provide for internal security without additional assistance for at least 2 more years. It is now clear that assumptions made in 2006 about the operational and strategic environment in 2007 and beyond have been rendered untenable due to the dynamic nature of the current environment. Thus, the Department must adjust accordingly or risk losing the precious gains made.

It was assumed that the strength of the insurgents and terrorists would not increase significantly in numbers and that, most likely, the overall level of violence would decline before the Iraqi Security Force reached full strength, allowing it to manage the fight without Coalition support. However, the enemy in Iraq has proven more resilient than anticipated. Terrorists and insurgents clearly see the Iraqi Security Force as a threat and attack them at every opportunity. They operate in small groups, employ guerilla tactics using light weapons, and make extensive use of fixed, personnel-borne and vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). All the while the enemy seeks to undermine public confidence in the Iraqi Security Force. Militias have contributed to a growing sense of sectarian divisiveness, making the Iraqi Security Force's role in promoting national unity even more important and yet more difficult. Levels of violence have remained elevated, meaning that the size and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Force must increase to overmatch the enemy.

Tactical skills of some existing units have also deteriorated over time. This requires that the Iraqi Army and Police establish a training and reconstitution program while still accomplishing its ongoing missions. Lessons learned from Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan, roughly translated as “Rule of Law”) and related ISF deployments reveal that the Iraqi Army and National Police lack depth to protect base camps, maintain control of associated battlespace, deploy to critical areas, and do it all while exercising basic life cycle force management. The ISF is also challenged in reconstituting forces deployed to Baghdad, as newly trained soldiers and equipment received are prioritized to units involved in Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon. The present ISF logistics system can sustain a fixed force, but is significantly challenged when put in motion. Combined with the shortage of leaders, these conditions limit the number of missions ISF units can perform. Key enablers (logistics, additional forces) are included in this amended request to ensure the Iraqi Army and Police continue to move toward security self-reliance.

In October of 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister decided that the tactical combat battalions should be manned at 110% of their authorized strength. And more recently, the Commanding General of MNF-I decided that the lessons of Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon in Baghdad indicated the clear need to increase the manning levels of these combat battalions even further - up to 120% - of their authorized end strength. Over-manning units was designed to alleviate problems due to high operational tempo and inefficient pay policies. For example, on average 25% of the force is on leave at any one time because soldiers physically take money home to their families. The security ministries are taking steps to effect direct deposit and electronic banking but it will take years to implement. Another example shows that seriously wounded soldiers are not moved off the unit rolls because there is no functioning retirement system in Iraq. Moving them off the rolls imposes incredible hardship on medically retired soldiers and their families who have already made enormous sacrifices. Furthermore, Iraqi Commanders are reluctant to deploy their entire unit and leave their bases unsecured. The risk of yielding their Area of Responsibility to the enemy is causing commanders at the battalion level to hold approximately 25% of their combat power from the fight. While the increase to 120% in the combat battalions is helping relieve these pressures, it is clear that the Iraqi Army lacks the battalion level depth required to execute true life cycle force management.

The *In-Stride Assessment*, coupled with subsequent (but separate) analysis by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) Division Commanders and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, revealed that the 2007 growth plan has addressed many but not all of the structural gaps in the ISF. The need to generate additional force structure and the requirement to increase the manning levels of existing force structure has magnified the GOI’s force management challenges. New units and increased manning raise demand for trained leaders and a larger training base to support leader and soldier training, and require a correspondingly robust logistics infrastructure. These increased demands place a strain on the Ministry of Defense’s and Ministry of Interior’s nascent institutional force management systems; it also increases the risk that the ISF will not be able to improve its capabilities rapidly enough to take over security missions currently performed by coalition forces. This funding amendment addresses these realities and ensures that the growth of ISF force structure does not outstrip the ability and capacity of the systems needed for building and sustaining that force structure.


## Strategy for Fiscal Year 2008

The near and mid-term missions of the United States Mission-Iraq (USM-I) and MNF-I is to help the people of Iraq achieve security self reliance by the summer of 2009, and to advance reconciliation alongside political and economic development, through the pursuit of three main objectives: secure the population, leverage military progress for political purposes, and reform the security sector. The mission of the MNSTC-I is to assist the GOI in achieving security self reliance by helping develop security forces able to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations and by building ministerial capacity to effectively manage these forces. Figure 1 graphically portrays how the MNSTC-I strategy will assist the ISF achieve sustainable security.

The MNSTC-I is pursuing a comprehensive four-phase strategy to Build, Enhance, Develop, and Transition the ISF to the Government of Iraq's control as soon as possible. As described previously, this plan has experienced some delays, but is now continuing on an established trajectory. The four phases are:

1. Phase I (BUILD) ensures the initial Iraqi Security Forces are organized, trained, equipped and based.
2. Phase II (ENHANCE) makes the generated forces better by adding capabilities including armor protection, increased weaponry and advanced leader training.
3. Phase III (DEVELOP), ties the tactical formations to a developed institutional capacity and sets the conditions for their transition to self-reliance.
4. Phase IV (TRANSITION) completes transfer of internal security and financial responsibility to the Government of Iraq while assisting Iraqis to prepare to defend against external threats, based on a common understanding of long-term security relationships.

**Figure 1. Closing the Gap between Force Structure and Essential Systems**



While these phases are conceptually sequential, they overlap in execution. Stated simply, MNSTC-I works in multiple phases simultaneously. As the BUILD-phase of the plan tapers off, the ISF is switching focus from building individual soldiers to building joint capabilities (e.g. air transport, aerial reconnaissance, and maritime coastal security), more enablers (e.g. fire support and route clearance), more logistics (e.g. motor transport regiments and logistics battalions), and more mid-grade leaders (e.g. non-commissioned officers and field grade officers). Many of the forces are engaged in countering the ongoing insurgency and are about to enter the ENHANCE-phase of the strategy. Success during this phase will require sufficient funds to complete the planned force structure, add the enablers and provide headroom for units to regenerate, retrain and revitalize. The shift in emphasis to ENHANCE will apply not only to the tactical trainers preparing the force, but also to the institutional sectors of the military and police forces. The goal is to TRANSITION responsibility for all force management functions to the two Iraqi security ministries, starting with acquisition, sustainment, professional development and budget execution as soon as practical. The following is a description and justification of each of the areas MNSTC-I will focus on with the 2008 ISFF budget in order to accomplish the objectives of the BUILD, ENHANCE, DEVELOP, TRANSITION strategy.

Expanding ISF Units

Supporting the expansion of the Iraqi Army and Police Forces to fill critical capability gaps is one area in which MNSTC-I will



continue to assist the Government of Iraq. This consists of two growth areas: adding additional units and increasing unit force depth. MNF-I, MNSTC-I and MNC-I have used the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) and Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) processes to identify gaps in ISF capability including: maneuver, tactical mobility and deployability, sustainment, tactical and operational command and control, fire power, reconnaissance and intelligence, survivability, and combat overmatch. They also continue to be hampered by a lack of depth. The growth of the ISF to 13 divisions will provide enough divisional structure to cover the battlespace, but additional units are needed. The existing units will not provide sufficient tactical depth for sustained operations and rotational capability required to dominate the battlespace and provide opportunity for collective training. In addition, fixed sites, such as police stations, border forts, and small base camps lack the heavy machine guns to stop attack by suicide vehicle borne IEDs. In many small unit engagements, Al Qaeda and other opponents achieved firepower parity with ISF. Furthermore, Iraq still lacks an Air Force capable of providing combat support and a naval force to protect the key offshore oil terminals on which the future of the nation rides. These shortcomings are largely covered now by the presence of Coalition forces. If not addressed, these gaps will either require Coalition forces to remain engaged in the counter insurgency fight, or will greatly increase the long-term vulnerability of the ISF after the redeployment of Coalition tactical units. Growing the ISF by adding units and increasing end strength should enable the ISF to assume many responsibilities currently performed by the Coalition by the end of 2008. The initiatives identified are designed to mitigate the gaps and provide the basis for MNSTC-I recommendations for growth.

#### Proficiency, Professionalism, and Leadership

Another key area will be improving the proficiency and professionalism of all military and police leadership and units through an expanded training base and the assistance of embedded advisors. An essential component of increasing the capability of the ISF is the generation and development of leaders who possess the professional expertise to lead ISF units. Junior officers have been graduating from Iraqi military academies for nearly three years, but it has proved difficult to produce majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels. While some excellent leaders have emerged from within the force, the Iraqi unwillingness to create a wartime promotion system or an officer candidate school has meant that leader development has not kept up with soldier production. Heavy reliance on former regime officer recalls and retraining programs has partially filled the gap but these efforts remain insufficient. This situation is particularly acute with respect to pilots, given the relatively long period of time required to train qualified pilots. Only an increased emphasis on recruiting leaders and an expansion of professional education opportunities will provide the necessary leadership for the ISF. The MNSTC-I is working with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to develop a suite of solutions to the leader shortages across the ISF. Included will be options for expanded Officer accession programs, greater use of time-in-service and time-in-grade waivers, and recall of vetted mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers.

#### Logistics and Maintenance Capability

Completing logistics and maintenance capability of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is another critical area of emphasis in 2008. The ISF current logistics system is based on sustaining a fixed force, but this system is significantly challenged when asked to deploy or support deployed forces. Operations have shown that the static regional and

garrison approach to logistics does not support the tactical scheme of maneuver. Consequently, the effectiveness of the ISF is being limited by its immature logistic infrastructure. The ISF need additional Motor Transport Regiments (MTRs), more robust Ammunition Supply Points, increased mobile signal and maintenance capabilities, and better trained logisticians. The BUILD phase of the plan produced sufficient numbers of infantryman but it did not “grow” an adequate number of personnel to sustain the force. The commensurate amount of repair parts, maintenance facilities and other logistics enablers must be increased in order to support the growing force. Reconstitution has also been a challenge for the ISF. Many units have been constantly engaged in the counterinsurgency fight and have damaged or destroyed equipment. The Iraqi logistic system has been slow to dispose of these items and find replacements. In the past, the ISF has relied on contracts and the Coalition to perform the logistics function but the time has come to increase the organic logistic capabilities of the security ministries.

#### Develop Ministerial Capacity

Despite significant political challenges, the security ministries have expanded their capacity. The MNSTC-I ministerial-level transition teams are now poised to ENHANCE and DEVELOP institutional capacity and extend that success throughout the Iraqi security enterprise. Previous efforts focused ministerial goals on producing capable ISF soldiers at the expense of developing sustainable business processes. Current and future efforts emphasize a more holistic approach to building enduring security institutions. Demonstrating that approach, the Iraqis have made a choice to use the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program as a preferred method of acquisition to expand and develop the force. Examples of Iraqi funded FMS Cases include: Iraqi Police SUVs; Iraqi Police trucks; and Aircraft Upgrades. To date, Iraq has deposited over \$2.8 billion for FMS cases, with another \$.5 billion to \$1 billion expected by the end of calendar year 2007. Use of FMS encourages the security ministries to align resources with force requirements and develop institutional planning and programming capacity. The MNSTC-I main effort, therefore, is to build institutions, organizations and processes that can not only generate programmed forces, but also replenish and sustain fielded forces. Assisting the Iraqis build functional expertise in the areas of force management, acquisition, training, budget execution, distribution, deployment, sustainment, and separation will support the Joint Campaign Plan objectives and contribute to the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq.

#### Risks and Impact

The strategy outlined above is not risk free. It is dependent on the Iraqi ministries being able to manage the large infusion of security capability proposed by MNSTC-I. It relies on finding sufficient and suitable leader candidates within the Iraqi population. Additionally, unit growth efforts need to be synchronized with leader and logistic enhancements. The MNSTC-I believes these risks are manageable. The impact of funding less than the \$3.0 billion request in FY 2008 could affect the ability of the ISF to provide for its own country’s security. Finally, without the capabilities identified in Section III “Funding Requirements by Capability,” which lists the projects the ISFF will fund, the ISF will experience these difficulties: Iraqi Army will match but not overmatch the enemy; Iraqi units will fight with unacceptably low end strengths; Iraqi units will operate without sufficient leadership; Iraqi forces will be unable to sustain current operational tempo; the enemy will surge to areas uncovered by deploying units.

## Figure 2. Current Status: Iraqi Security Forces

### Force Structure Summary:

#### End State

The ISF will consist of a respected, multi-ethnic, affordable, and sustainable force capable of combined combat operations within a Joint structure. The ISF is dedicated to protecting Iraqi citizens, maintaining national security and territorial integrity by upholding the rule of law, combating insurgents, terrorists/criminal activities, and providing a safe, secure environment for economic and political growth.

### Defense Forces

#### End State

Iraqi Defense Forces will consist of a respected, multi-ethnic, affordable and sustainable Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Army, Air Force, and Navy capable of limited combined arms combat operations within a Joint structure, to include maneuver, sustainment and command and control. The COIN force will provide for the security of Iraq with limited and defined International support.

### Status of Trained/Ministry of Defense Forces

	<u>(as of September 2007)</u>	<u>(projected December 2008)</u>
Iraqi Army	190,800	250,077
Iraqi Air Force	2,900	3,200
Iraqi Navy	1,500	2,300
<b>Total</b>	<b>195,200</b>	<b>255,577</b>

## **Interior Forces**

### **End State**

Iraqi Interior Forces will be an effective, well-organized, ethnically representative and professional police force that provides law enforcement to the people of Iraq. This force will enable a safe and secure environment for economic and political growth. The Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF) will be loyal to the GoI and maintain domestic order, protect the rights of Iraqi citizens, deny a safe haven to terrorists, effectively enforce border security, and safeguard the nation's infrastructure.

### **Status of Trained/Equipped Ministry of Interior forces:**

	<b><u>(as of September 2007)</u></b>	<b><u>(projected December 2008)</u></b>
Police	229,300	263,000
Border Enforcement	38,000	42,000
National Police	25,700	27,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>293,000</b>	<b>332,600</b>

Total MoD and MoI Trained/Equipped: **488,200** (as of September 2007); **588,177** (projected December 2008)

## Conclusion

The MNSTC-I is working to increase the quantity and improve the professionalism of ISF leaders, address the issues of logistics and sustainability, ensure ISF forces have combat capability that exceeds that of their enemies, and help Iraq's security leaders develop the institutional capacity to independently manage their forces. The Iraqis currently have critical gaps in each of these areas, and coalition forces currently cover these capability gaps. Failure to address these Iraqi security gaps would lock U.S. forces into tactical battlespace and greatly increase the risk to the ISF should the Coalition presence decline dramatically in the near future. The MNSTC-I has taken the analyses and revamped the previously submitted FY 2008 ISFF request to fund particular capabilities identified from the many reviews. Section III, "Funding Requirements by Capability" displays these recognized capabilities with information on the various sub-activity group (SAG) portions that later in this material will be detailed again within each SAG.

The BUILD, ENHANCE, DEVELOP, and TRANSITION phases are conceptually sequential, but overlap considerably in practice. As the United States continues the building, enhancing, and developing phases of its efforts, MNSTC-I continues to transition institutional responsibilities to Iraqi leadership and Iraqi security forces as soon as they are able to assume those responsibilities. The last 3 years has demonstrated that transition is a balancing act: on one side is assimilation, and on the other side is dependency. Pass responsibility too soon and the system falters. Pass responsibility too late and the system becomes dependent on coalition support. The MNSTC-I seeks to strike this balance daily as it synchronizes its efforts across an enormously broad range of activities.

### III. Funding Requirements by Capability

Many of the MOD and MOI projects MNSTC-I will fund require the funding in more than one SAG. The following tables provide a summary of the \$3 billion requested for the ISF by budget activity, by project, and by SAG.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	Infrastructure	18,800
	Equipment	49,800
	Training	10,500
	Sustainment	3,500
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>82,600</b>
Ammunition Supply Point	Infrastructure	18,600
	Equipment	4,800
	Training	600
	Sustainment	1,600
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>25,600</b>
Mobile Maintenance Capability within Mobile Transportation Regiment	Infrastructure	10,000
	Equipment	49,300
	Training	1,600
	Sustainment	9,500
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>70,400</b>
Additional Regional Support Unit	Infrastructure	23,000
	Equipment	36,500
	Training	5,400
	Sustainment	12,700
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>77,600</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES: (Continued)	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	Infrastructure	43,400
	Equipment	164,200
	Training	23,100
	Sustainment	23,200
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>253,900</b>
Engineering IED Defeat	Infrastructure	113,300
	Equipment	253,700
	Training	4,800
	Sustainment	57,100
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>428,900</b>
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	Infrastructure	6,300
	Equipment	120,000
	Training	3,700
	Sustainment	12,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>142,000</b>
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	Infrastructure	9,400
	Equipment	82,500
	Training	5,600
	Sustainment	18,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>115,500</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES: (Continued)	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	Infrastructure	22,500
	Equipment	3,500
	Training	1,500
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>27,500</b>
Increase Engineering School Capacity	Infrastructure	5,000
	Equipment	1,800
	Training	600
	Sustainment	600
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>8,000</b>	
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	Infrastructure	23,200
	Equipment	105,200
	Training	7,100
	Sustainment	10,300
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>145,800</b>	
Increase Explosive Ordinance Disposal School Capacity	Infrastructure	5,000
	Equipment	1,800
	Training	600
	Sustainment	600
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>8,000</b>	



MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES: (Continued)	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	Equipment	21,800
	Training	600
	Sustainment	1,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>23,400</b>
Communication Repair Section in Regional Support Unit (RSU)	Equipment	23,000
	Training	400
	Sustainment	4,600
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>28,000</b>
Ministerial Capacity	Training	50,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>50,000</b>
<b>TOTAL MOD</b>		<b>1,487,200</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Retrain Iraqi Police	Infrastructure	30,500
	Equipment	60,100
	Training	17,000
	Sustainment	5,600
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>113,200</b>
Carabinieri-like Training	Infrastructure	8,000
	Equipment	18,600
	Training	13,600
	Sustainment	4,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>44,200</b>
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	Infrastructure	46,200
	Equipment	186,300
	Training	58,400
	Sustainment	66,100
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>357,000</b>
DBE HQ National Command and Control	Equipment	1,500
	Training	3,600
	Sustainment	700
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,800</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES: (Continued)	FY2008	
	SAG	Amendment
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	Equipment	36,000
	Training	16,800
	Sustainment	2,600
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>55,400</b>
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	Equipment	89,500
	Training	63,900
	Sustainment	27,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>180,400</b>
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract	Training	400,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>400,000</b>
Ministerial Capacity Development	Training	50,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>50,000</b>
<b>TOTAL MOI</b>		<b>1,206,000</b>

**TOTAL FY08 ISFF:**

	<b>SAG</b>	<b>FY2008 Amendment</b>
	(Dollars in Thousands)	
Ministry of Defense	Infrastructure	298,500
	Equipment	917,900
	Training	116,100
	Sustainment	154,700
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,487,200</b>
Ministry of Interior	Infrastructure	84,700
	Equipment	392,000
	Training	623,300
	Sustainment	106,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,206,000</b>
Related Activities	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>306,800</b>
<b>TOTAL ISFF</b>		<b>3,000,000</b>

#### IV. Reconciliation of Original FY 2008 Request to FY 2008 Amendment

This revised justification book takes the original submission and provides greater definition and, in response to recent analysis, expanded ISF capabilities urgently required to fill existing gaps.

<b>ISFF FY 2008 Request</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)	<b>Original FY 2008</b>	
<b>Ministry of Defense:</b>		<b>Request</b>	<b>FY 2008 Amendment</b>
Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) Equipment		753,000	428,900 *
Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Systems' Development		290,000	403,300 *
Defense Forces Training		50,000	50,000
Aircrew Training		27,000	16,400 *
Taji National Depot Operations		115,000	307,600 *
Naval Maintenance		20,000	0
<b>Original MOD Projects, Subtotal</b>		<b>1,255,000</b>	<b>1,206,200</b>
<b>New Projects MOD, Subtotal</b>			<b>281,000</b>
<b>MOD TOTAL</b>		<b>1,255,000</b>	<b>1,487,200</b>
<b>Ministry of Interior:</b>			
General Office Automation		40,000	0
Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF)		205,000	0
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract		450,000	400,000
Ministerial Capacity Development		50,000	50,000
<b>Original MOI Projects, Subtotal</b>		<b>745,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>
<b>New MOI Projects, Subtotal</b>			<b>806,000</b>
<b>MOI TOTAL</b>		<b>745,000</b>	<b>1,206,000</b>
<b>Related Activities</b>			
<b>Subtotal</b>		-	<b>306,800</b>
 <b>TOTAL</b>		 <b>2,000,000</b>	 <b>3,000,000</b>

\* Distributed across multiple projects and Sub-Activity Groups

Budget projects in the original FY 2008 request supported an anticipated security environment much different than now faced. As noted above in the Overview section, the assumptions made on what challenges we would face turned out to be false. The general concepts for what would be required in a more benign security environment were understood, but the concepts were not clearly defined. The increased threat level, and our response to it (the surge) have brought clarity on how we could best allocate our finite resources. No funding was included in the original FY 2008 request for Related Activities.

**A. Ministry of Defense Projects** (Original Request → Amendment Request)

**Iraqi Ground Forces: \$753,000,000 → \$428,900,000**

This project, while titled “Iraqi Ground Forces Equipment,” was composed of the following four smaller subprojects identified in the February request:

	<u>Original FY 2008</u>	<u>Amended FY 2008</u>
1. Enhanced IED Defeat Capability	\$250M	\$428.9M
2. Pure Fleet Commonality	\$471M	-
3. Modernized Firearms	\$11M	-
4. Night Vision	<u>\$21M</u>	<u>-</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$750M</b>	<b>\$428.9M</b>

Enhanced IED Defeat Capability. This requirement has remained and has grown in scope, from \$250M to \$428.9M, primarily to include infrastructure, sustainment and training in addition to equipment (Engineering IED Defeat). Establishing an IED Defeat capability has been identified as one of the most important requirements for the Iraqis to assume self-sufficiency.

Pure Fleet Commonality. With better visibility of security gaps, creating commonality among the fleet of Iraqi vehicles has been deferred to secondary importance at this time.

Modernized Firearms. This continuing high priority for Iraqi self-sufficiency will be one of the uses of Iraqi funding through Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

Night Vision. Purchasing of night vision technology for the Iraqis is no longer part of the FY 2008 ISFF request.

**Iraqi Air Forces (IqAF) Systems Development: \$290,000,000 → \$403,300,000**

The February request had an equipment project for IqAF Systems' Development of \$290M that was composed of the following five smaller sub-projects:

	<u>Original FY 2008</u>	<u>Amended FY 2008</u>
1. COIN/Precision Munitions	\$16M	\$142.0M
2. Fixed Wing Aircraft	\$40M	\$145.8M
3. Light Transport	\$36M	-
4. ISR Fixed Wing Aircraft	\$88M	-
5. Air Defense/Air Traffic Control System	\$110M	-
6. Rotary Wing Helicopters	-	<u>\$115.5M</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$290M</b>	<b>\$403.3M</b>

COIN/Precision Munitions → Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters) (\$142M). The original request of \$16M was insufficient to pay for the capability identified through subsequent analyses. The goal remains the same; the IqAF relies heavily on coalition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and close air support. This funding is targeted at equipping the IqAF with aircraft and precision munitions for COIN operations and providing specialized training to develop future IqAF pilots and enhance counter insurgency capabilities.

Fixed Wing and Light Transport Aircraft → Fixed Wing Transports (King Air 350) (\$145.8M). Previously requested funding was insufficient to pay for the recently defined requirement. The IqAF has selected the King Air 350 as the solution to both its fixed wing and light transport aircraft needs, which is why they were combined into a single project. The current IqAF aircraft does not fully support a modern/mobile land force. Addressing the two previous equipment requirements decreases the reliance on coalition forces as well as prepares the IqAF for sustained future operations.

ISR Fixed Wing Aircraft and Air Defense/ Air Traffic Control Systems. These projects were cut from the FY 2008 submission. As with the other aircraft requests, costs were grossly underestimated. After reviewing the FMS cost figures, MNSTC-I decided that with the limited resources available, the Iraqi AF would focus on the current aircraft listed and forego both the ISR Fixed Wing and Air Traffic Control in lieu of higher priorities. Additional aircraft will have to be considered in subsequent years for funding, possibly through FMS.

Iraqi Air Forces (IqAF) Systems Development now includes Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters (\$115.5M).

**Defense Forces Training: \$50,000,000 → \$50,000,000**

This project is now titled “Ministerial Capacity.” Although the name changed slightly and the justification language is more detailed, it is the same effort as proposed in the original FY 2008 request.

**Aircrew Training: \$27,000,000 → \$16,400,000**

Aircrew training in the initial FY 2008 request was included in one project totaling \$27M. In this revised submission, the aircrew training is identified by the specific project (Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters), Fixed Wing Transports (King Air 350), and Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters). The cost for training aircrews for the various aircraft projects now totals \$16.4M, with deferment of some aircraft purchases.

**Taji National Depot Operations: \$115,000,000 → \$307,600,000**

The Taji National Depot has, over time, evolved into many smaller projects, some of which were funded with FY 2007 ISFF. The focused investment on the Taji National Depot Project as the original logistics shortfall solution has been reviewed and separate requirements have since been defined with higher priority. These new projects, many of which will be located at or based out of Taji, will perform a majority of the original tasks included in the original Taji plan, and many others, in support of the newly defined logistical requirements. In this budget amendment, projects identified as Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Support Battalion (\$82.6M), Enhance Division Logistics Planning (\$23.4M), Ammunition Supply Point (\$25.6M), Mobile Maintenance Capability within Mobile Transportation Regiment (MTR) (\$70.4M), Communication Repair Section in RSUs (\$28M), and Additional Regional Support Unit (\$77.6M) address logistical needs.

**Naval Maintenance: \$20,000,000 → \$0**

This project was removed from the FY 2008 amendment when funded with reprioritized FY 2007 funds. Although limited, the Iraqi Navy is growing in surface patrol capability and remains a vital operational capability. The FY 2007 funding sustained the IqN fleet and initiated a “train the trainer” program in order to meet the goal of maintaining security of Iraq’s sea lanes and critical oil assets.

**B. Ministry of Interior Projects**

**General Office Automation: \$40,000,000 → \$0**

This project represented a general initiative to automate offices across the many directorates within the MoI. With the present security situation requiring reprioritization, strengthening the security forces is the top priority. Therefore, this requested funding has been reprogrammed for higher priority requirements.



**Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF): \$205,000,000 → \$0**

The funding was originally envisioned to achieve “Pure Fleet Commonality” across the MoI. This present security situation requires that limited ISFF funds be better utilized on other priorities establishing a more capable Iraqi Security Force. Therefore, this project has been dropped and the funding reprogrammed to higher priority requirements.

**International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract: \$450,000,000 → \$400,000,000**

The original FY 2008 International Narcotics and Law (INL) Enforcement contract inadvertently included Ministerial Capacity Development. This revised submission breaks out Ministerial Capacity as its own project. The INL contract with the Department of State will be funded at \$400M.

**Ministerial Capacity Development: \$50,000,000 → \$50,000,000**

Funding for this project remains unchanged in the FY 2008 budget amendment.

**C. New Projects**

New projects have been added to address the change in our strategic and operational environment in Iraq. Requirements were defined through recent analyses by both the U.S. military and the Government of Iraq.

## V. Project Level Detail by Sub-Activity Group (SAG)

### A. FY 2008 Investment in Proposed Growth of the Ministry of Defense Forces

It is now clear that assumptions made in 2006 about the strategic and operational environment in 2007 and beyond are invalid. Accordingly, the original FY 2008 request, developed in fall 2006, contained projects that were not designed to support the current, changing environment. The projects focused more on logistics than increasing defense forces that we now know is also required. The increased threat level and our response to it (the surge) have brought into clarity how we should best allocate our finite resources. The original submission exhibits were composed of elements of the projects listed below them that are now defined with greater clarity. To achieve the ability to operate independently, Iraqi forces must develop capabilities to replace the Coalition enablers on which they now rely, such as combat support (including aviation support), combat service support (logistics, supply chain management and maintenance), and training. In particular, this requires a larger logistics and maintenance system. Similarly, the Iraqi Air Force and Navy will require additional personnel to improve logistics and maintenance. The expansion plan for ISF addresses these requirements.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Infrastructure:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	18,800	18,800
Ammunition Supply Point	0	18,600	18,600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	10,000	10,000
Add Regional Support Unit	0	23,000	23,000
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	43,400	43,400
Engineering IED Defeat	0	113,300	113,300
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	6,300	6,300
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	9,400	9,400
Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	22,500	22,500
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	5,000	5,000
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	5,000	5,000
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	23,200	23,200
<b>Subtotal, Infrastructure</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>298,500</b>	<b>298,500</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Equipment and Transportation:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) Equipment	753,000	-753,000	0
Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Systems' Development	290,000	-290,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	49,800	49,800
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	21,800	21,800
Ammunition Supply Point	0	4,800	4,800
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	49,300	49,300
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	23,000	23,000
Add Regional Support Unit	0	36,500	36,500
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	164,200	164,200
Engineering IED Defeat	0	253,700	253,700
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	120,000	120,000
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	82,500	82,500
Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	3,500	3,500
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	1,800	1,800
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	1,800	1,800
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	105,200	105,200
<b>Subtotal, Equipment and Transportation</b>	<b>1,043,000</b>	<b>-125,100</b>	<b>917,900</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Training:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Defense Forces Training	50,000	-50,000	0
Aircrew Training	27,000	-27,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	10,500	10,500
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	600	600
Ammunition Supply Point	0	600	600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	1,600	1,600
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	400	400
Add Regional Support Unit	0	5,400	5,400
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	23,100	23,100
Engineering IED Defeat	0	4,800	4,800
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	3,700	3,700
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	5,600	5,600
Expand 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	1,500	1,500
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	600	600
Ministerial Capacity	0	50,000	50,000
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	600	600
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	7,100	7,100
<b>Subtotal, Training</b>	<b>77,000</b>	<b>39,100</b>	<b>116,100</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Sustainment:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Taji National Depot Operations	115,000	-115,000	0
Naval Maintenance	20,000	-20,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	3,500	3,500
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	1,000	1,000
Ammunition Supply Point	0	1,600	1,600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	9,500	9,500
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	4,600	4,600
Add Regional Support Unit	0	12,700	12,700
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	23,200	23,200
Engineering IED Defeat	0	57,100	57,100
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	12,000	12,000
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	18,000	18,000
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	600	600
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	600	600
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	10,300	10,300
<b>Subtotal, Sustainment</b>	<b>135,000</b>	<b>19,700</b>	<b>154,700</b>

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Total:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Infrastructure	0	298,500	298,500
Equipment and Transportation	1,043,000	-125,100	917,900
Training	77,000	39,100	116,100
Sustainment	135,000	19,700	154,700
<b>TOTAL, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE</b>	<b>1,255,000</b>	<b>232,200</b>	<b>1,487,200</b>

## B. FY 2008 Investment in Proposed Growth of the Ministry of Interior Forces

The ISF expansion plan also includes an increase in MoI forces in large part due to the requirement to hold areas cleared in the last several months, particularly in Baghdad, Al Anbar and Diyala provinces. Local hiring of police in the regions has created a training requirement that is resourced in the expansion plan. Lessons learned from Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon (the Baghdad Security Plan, roughly translated as “Rule of Law”) and related Iraqi Security Force (ISF) deployments reveal that the Iraqi Army and National Police lack depth to protect base camps, maintain control of associated battlespace, deploy to critical areas, and do it all while exercising basic life cycle force management. The ISF logistics system is designed to sustain a fixed force, and is significantly challenged when put in motion. Combined with the shortage of leaders, limits the number of missions units can perform. Key enablers (logistics, additional forces) are needed to ensure Army and Police continue to move toward self-reliance.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	<b>FY 2008</b>		
<b>Infrastructure:</b>	<b>FY 2008</b>	<b>Delta</b>	<b>Amend</b>
	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	30,500	30,500
Carabinieri-like Training	0	8,000	8,000
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	46,200	46,200
<b>Subtotal, Infrastructure</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>84,700</b>	<b>84,700</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Equipment and transportation:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
General Office Automation	40,000	-40,000	0
Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF)	205,000	-205,000	0
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	60,100	60,100
Carabinieri-like Training	0	18,600	18,600
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	186,300	186,300
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	1,500	1,500
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	36,000	36,000
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	89,500	89,500
<b>Subtotal, Equipment and Transportation</b>	<b>245,000</b>	<b>147,000</b>	<b>392,000</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Training:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	17,000	17,000
Carabinieri-like Training	0	13,600	13,600
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	58,400	58,400
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract	450,000	-50,000	400,000
Ministerial Capacity Development	50,000	0	50,000
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	3,600	3,600
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	16,800	16,800
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	63,900	63,900
<b>Subtotal, Training</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>123,300</b>	<b>623,300</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Sustainment:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	5,600	5,600
Carabinieri-like Training	0	4,000	4,000
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	66,100	66,100
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	700	700
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	2,600	2,600
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	27,000	27,000
<b>Subtotal, Sustainment</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>106,000</b>	<b>106,000</b>

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Total:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Infrastructure	0	84,700	84,700
Equipment and Transportation	245,000	147,000	392,000
Training	500,000	123,300	623,300
Sustainment	0	106,000	106,000
<b>TOTAL, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR</b>	<b>745,000</b>	<b>461,000</b>	<b>1,206,000</b>



**C. FY 2008 Related Activities**

To support the success of MoI forces, the capability to detain and process insurgents and criminals must be enhanced. Therefore, this amendment requests additional funds toward the development of related activities, such as detention centers and rule of law complexes.

RELATED ACTIVITIES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Detainment Centers Iraqi Corrections Officers	0	55,400	55,400
TIFRIC Iraqi Corrections Officers	0	96,400	96,400
Rule of Law Complexes Iraqi Security Forces Component	0	80,000	80,000
Quick Response Fund	0	75,000	75,000
<b>TOTAL, RELATED ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>306,800</b>	<b>306,800</b>

**D. Grand Total of Revised FY 2008 ISFF Request**

TOTAL FY08 ISFF	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Ministry of Defense	1,255,000	232,000	1,487,000
Ministry of Interior	745,000	461,000	1,206,000
Related Activities	0	307,000	307,000
<b>TOTAL ISFF</b>	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>1,000,000</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>

## VI. Ministry of Defense - Revised FY 2008 Budget Submission

Although significant progress has been achieved in the last four years, capability gaps have been identified in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) teams, through the Transition Readiness Assessment process as well as through the reporting of the military transition, have validated those capability gaps. Areas of identified ISF weakness include: lack of maneuver capabilities; tactical mobility and deployability; sustainment; tactical and operational command and control; fire power; reconnaissance and intelligence; survivability; and combat overmatch. Currently, these gaps are satisfied by Coalition Forces. This assessment is supported by a Center for Army Analysis (CAA) study and other recent capability and force structure reviews. If not addressed, these gaps will require Coalition Forces to remain in support of the counter insurgency fight, or greatly increase the long-term vulnerability of the ISF after the redeployment of Coalition tactical and support units. Growing the ISF and implementing recommended adaptations will enable the Government of Iraq (GoI) to assume many Coalition responsibilities by the end of 2008. After extensive research and analysis, the following specific Ministry of Defence capabilities have been identified for United States Government (USG) funding, as part of a defined ISF growth package. Funding support for the entire force growth package will be shared between the USG and the GoI.

### Ministry of Defense Forces, BA-1

(Dollars in Thousands)	Original Request	Delta	Revised Request
<b>Infrastructure</b>	-	<b>+298,500</b>	<b>298,500</b>
<b>Equipment &amp; Transportation</b>	<b>1,043,000</b>	<b>-125,100</b>	<b>917,900</b>
<b>Training</b>	<b>77,000</b>	<b>+39,100</b>	<b>116,100</b>
<b>Sustainment</b>	<b>135,000</b>	<b>+19,700</b>	<b>154,700</b>
<b>TOTAL MOD</b>	<b>1,255,000</b>	<b>+232,200</b>	<b>1,487,200</b>

## A. Infrastructure

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Infrastructure:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	18,800	18,800
Ammunition Supply Point	0	18,600	18,600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	10,000	10,000
Add Regional Support Unit	0	23,000	23,000
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	43,400	43,400
Engineering IED Defeat	0	113,300	113,300
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	6,300	6,300
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	9,400	9,400
Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	22,500	22,500
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	5,000	5,000
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	5,000	5,000
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	23,200	23,200
<b>Subtotal, Infrastructure</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>298,500</b>	<b>298,500</b>

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion

**Location:** Diyala (Tentative)

**Amount:** \$18.8 million

**Description/Justification:** The "ISOF Support Battalion" will be a large "Regional Support Unit" (like a US Army Area Support Group) that will assume the installation life support and sustainment mission. This support unit will provide needed logistical support for the expanded ISOF forces as the IRAQI ISOF forces grow and U.S. support logistical support diminishes.

- a. HQ Staff Buildings
- b. Barracks and Mess Hall expansion
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the Counter Insurgency.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Ammunition Supply Point

**Location:** TBD

**Amount:** \$18.6 million

**Description/Justification:** This funding is to provide for three (3) Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs). The ASPs will operate as close to the division's rear boundary as possible, while facilitating a maximum turn-around time of 4 to 4 1/2 hours for unit re-supply vehicles. In order to meet these goals, it was determined that Iraq would need at least three locations. The ASP will maintain a stockage of high-volume munitions and ammunition for units located in the supported division's area. The ASPs are operated by one of the corps level support unit and direct support ammunition companies.

- a. Ammunition Storage Bunker Facilities at 3 separate locations (final locations TBD at time of publication)
- b. Maintenance Facilities at each ASP to service vehicles and weapons
- c. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets do not fall into enemy insurgent hands

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Mobile Maintenance Capability within Mobile Transportation Regiment (MTR)

**Location:** Co-located with existing Divisions

**Amount:** \$10.0 million

**Description/Justification:** To expand Iraqi Army Logistics capability, we need to add a mobile maintenance capability to the Mobile Transportation Regiment. Currently, when an Iraqi vehicle breaks down, they rely on either Coalition Forces to come and make repairs, or the vehicle must be brought to an existing maintenance facility. The Iraqi Army needs infrastructure to support the equipment for this capability (make repairs on the move). Infrastructure support for Contact Trucks and Field Workshops are critical to creating a mobile reactive force that can respond in a changing and developing environment.

- a. Maintenance Facility and Motor Pool to base unit
- b. HQ Building
- c. Classroom space to train maintenance forces
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Additional Regional Support Unit (RSU)

**Location:** Basrah

**Amount:** \$23.0 million

**Description/Justification:** The Iraqi military is currently unable to flex to meet contingencies both because its objective logistics structure is incomplete, and also because the planned capabilities were not designed to support deployments of battalion-size or greater forces. These capability shortfalls hinder not only operations in the COIN environment but also leave Iraqi's vulnerable logistically if attacked conventionally. By adding a Regional Support Unit, it will increase the tactical and operational depth of the logistics system. This, in conjunction with the significant increase in the manning of the Support Command, will round out the Iraqi logistics force.

- a. HQ Facility/office space
- b. Maintenance Facility and Motor Pool
- c. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. At present, the Iraqi Army is geographically fixed and requires extensive Coalition support when asked to depart home bases, as in support of Operation Fard Al Qanoon. This will improve significantly when regional support units reach full operational capability. Regional support units and other logistics enhancements will allow the ISF to support complex tactical operations over an extended period of time.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)

**Location:** Al Asad, Mosul, Diyala, and Basra

**Amount:** \$43.4 million

**Description/Justification:** The ISOF Brigade is establishing a 6th ISOF Battalion headquarters to command and control the regional expansion companies. These subordinate operational battalions will provide an advanced capability in the counter insurgency fight. Sustainment requirements for the new facilities and life support will be provided through the first three months of operations. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility for all maintenance and life support for all associated units.

- a. Battalion Offices
- b. Barracks/Dorms, Mess Hall
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Weapons Range
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the Counter Insurgency.



## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army –Additional Army

**Project:** Engineering IED Defeat

**Location:** Taji, Besmaya

**Amount:** \$113.3 million

**Description/Justification:** To counter the roadside bomb threat (Improvised Explosive Device Defeat), the Iraqi Engineer Company in each Division should be equipped with a route clearance capability robust and redundant enough to support the main effort within each Division sector. An additional \$113.3 million is requested for the infrastructure of engineering IED defeat enhancements. This line item is critical in defeating an enemy that is heavily involved in unconventional warfare. The engineers are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movements. The engineers will improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the Iraqi Army. Route Clearance operations are intended to maintain freedom of tactical maneuver and operational movement. Infrastructure will be required to effectively double existing capabilities throughout the Iraqi Army.

- a. Company HQ facilities at each Iraqi Division
- b. Motor pool and Maintenance Facility

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed in order to counter the roadside bomb threat; the Iraqi Engineer Company in each Division should be equipped with a route clearance capability robust and redundant enough to weight the main effort within each Division sector. If the Iraqi Armed Forces do not possess this capability, it will prolong US troops in theater currently performing this mission.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Counter Terror / COIN (Special Helicopter)

**Location:** Kirkuk and Taji AB

**Amount:** \$6.3 million

**Description/Justification:** These eight (8) aircraft are to be upgraded for the Counter Terror/COIN mission to meet the same requirements as the 16 previously upgraded Iraqi Huey IIs. Counter-terrorism-specific modifications should include the MX-15 EO/IR sensors, ALE/AAR-47 defensive systems as chosen for the Iraqi ISR aircraft, forward-firing machine guns and rockets, and an improved navigation suite utilizing multifunctional display cockpit instrumentation. This is a critical enabler to find, fix, target and kill insurgent forces acting against the population or ISF. Infrastructure will be enhanced at Kirkuk and Taji AB for both training crews and maintenance of aircraft.

- a. School Facilities at Kirkuk and Taji AB
- b. Hanger Improvements
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Campaign Plan. This capability is necessary to transfer the counter terrorism fight to the Iraqi Air Force. Specifically, this platform will assist the Iraqi Air Force in working with the Iraqi Army to transfer Special Operations troops in no-notice situations.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters

**Location:** Kirkuk and Taji AB

**Amount:** \$9.4 million

**Description/Justification:** These sixteen (16) aircraft are to be upgraded to meet the same standard as the 16 previously upgraded Iraqi Huey IIs. These helicopters will be used for battlefield mobility and flight training, both of which are essential capabilities to transition to the Iraqi Army ASAP. Battlefield Mobility is a key enabler in the fight against terrorism. The Iraqi Army must be able to move ISF to the point of impact quickly to provide overwhelming force to combat the insurgency and show the Iraqi people the government is in control and will protect them against the insurgent forces. Eight (8) of these aircraft will be based at Kirkuk and eight (8) will be based at Taji.

- a. School Facilities at Kirkuk and New Al Muthana AB
- b. Hanger Improvements
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) assets and destroy the insurgents, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions

**Location:** Taji

**Amount:** \$22.5 million

**Description/Justification:** Iraqi Training Battalions are necessary for individual, job specific training (occupational specialties). Each Iraqi training battalion will be capable to teaching up to 8 occupational specialty courses, most of which will be logistical specialties. This is necessary to support the training base expansion plan, which will increase the overall size of the Iraqi Army. Most of the cost is associated with infrastructure because of the added requirement of billeting and training space.

- a. School Facilities
- b. Billeting for students
- c. Training Ranges
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** If not funded, the Iraqi Army will not be able to support upgrades in all other mentioned areas, preventing pull-out of U.S. support and prolonging the war on terror.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity

**Location:** Taji

**Amount:** \$5.0 million

**Description/Justification:** Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment for school training is critical in Iraq for the purpose of dismantling and removing improvised explosive devices (IED) placed by insurgents. EOD personnel greatly improve combat effectiveness by maintaining the forward momentum of Iraqi units while simultaneously reducing the impact of the insurgent's most powerful weapon. There will be one EOD company per Iraqi division that can be split into small teams capable of covering large areas. This funding provides the Iraqi Army with the capability of producing mission focused motivated ordnance officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers, who are technically competent in munitions management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, electronic and missile maintenance, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment arenas.

- a. School Facilities
- b. Training Range
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is outlined in the Coalition plan to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Increase Engineering School Capacity

**Location:** Taji

**Amount:** \$5.0 million

**Description/Justification:** The Engineer School is located at Camp Taji and it must increase capacity in order to support force generation. The school is completely operated by the Iraqis with little coalition oversight. Their mission is to train engineers that are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movement. The engineers improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the IA. Training requirements will be heavily involved in explosives and tactical movements.

a. School Facilities at Taji

b. Training Range

c. Force Protection improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is outlined in the Coalition plan to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** Iraqi Army – Ministry of Defence

**Project:** Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)

**Location:** Kirkuk and New Al Muthana AB

**Amount:** \$23.2 million

**Description/Justification:** This project will develop the basic core infrastructure needed to train and provide support for the Iraqi Air Force to move Iraq Special Operations Forces (ISOF) and Very Important People (VIPs) quickly throughout Iraq. This project complements the acquisition of six (6) King Air 350 transport planes. Including the following items that will enable the use of these aircraft:

- a. School Facilities at Kirkuk and New Al Muthana AB
- b. Hanger Improvements
- c. Maintenance Facility
- d. Force Protection Improvements to ensure that these valuable assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by in 2008 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key ISOF assets and kill the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

**B. Equipment and Transportation**

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Equipment and Transportation:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) Equipment	753,000	-753,000	0
Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Systems' Development	290,000	-290,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	49,800	49,800
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	21,800	21,800
Ammunition Supply Point	0	4,800	4,800
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	49,300	49,300
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	23,000	23,000
Add Regional Support Unit	0	36,500	36,500
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	164,200	164,200
Engineering IED Defeat	0	253,700	253,700
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	120,000	120,000
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	82,500	82,500
Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	3,500	3,500
Increase Explosive Ordinance Disposal School Capacity	0	1,800	1,800
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	1,800	1,800
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	105,200	105,200
<b>Subtotal, Equipment and Transportation</b>	<b>1,043,000</b>	<b>-125,100</b>	<b>917,900</b>



APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 101	Iraqi Special Operations Force Support Battalion			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				49.8	
<p><b>Description:</b> The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Support Battalion has medical, supply, maintenance and transportation assets dedicated to providing direct support to a single brigade. The funds will procure the necessary equipment to outfit the Iraqi forces to stand up the Support Battalion.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the counter-insurgency.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 101	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 102	Enhance Division Logistics Planning			
					FY 2008
COST (in millions)					21.8
<p><b>Description:</b> The Division Logistics (G4) enhances Soldier logistics readiness by providing integrated policies and programs to maintain a ready Army that can be sustained in the joint operating environment. Funding this requirement will provide a G4 that is a capable logistics community that would maintain domain-wide visibility over requirements, resources, and priorities; anticipates and delivers capabilities with speed and precision to meet battle-focused operational needs of the division commander; and acts with unity of effort in the planning and execution of logistics across the area of operations.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. Not resourcing this critical requirement will leave the Iraqi Army dependent upon Coalition Forces to fill the logistical gap. Most division-level requirements such as supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services functions will leave the Iraq Divisions without the proper equipment to continue the fight against the insurgency.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		
		MNSTC-I 102		EXHIBIT P-40	

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 103	Ammunition Supply Point			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				4.8	
<p><b>Description:</b> This funding is to provide for three (3) Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs). The ASPs will operate as close to the division's rear boundary as possible, while facilitating a maximum turn-around time of 4 to 4.5 hours for unit re-supply vehicles. In order to meet these goals, it was determined the Iraqi Army needs at least three ASP locations. The ASP will maintain a stockage of high-volume munitions and ammunition for units located in the supported division's area. The ASPs are operated by a Corps-level support unit and direct support ammunition companies.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces. The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat counter insurgency.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
		MNSTC-I 103			

APPROPRIATION				BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND						October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD		
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 104	Mobile Maintenance Capabilities with Mobile Transportation Regiment (MTR)				
				FY 2008		
COST (in millions)				49.3		
<p><b>Description:</b> As an expansion of the Iraqi Army Logistics capabilities, a mobile maintenance capability to the Mobile Transportation Regiment is required. When military vehicles break down, the Iraqi Army relies on Coalition Forces to make repairs, or the vehicle taken to an existing maintenance facility, which could take weeks to months for repair. A summary of equipment includes Tactical Vehicles - Includes trucks, truck tractors, trailers, semi-trailers, personnel carriers and repair equipment and parts.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.</p>						
DD Form 2454 (7-88)		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40	
		MNSTC-I 104				

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 105	Communication Repair Section in RSUs			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				23.0	
<p><b>Description:</b> In an effort to dominate the battlefield by capitalizing on communication systems, this equipment funding is to provide for communications repair sections. The communication repair sections will provide for a more responsive and flexible Iraqi Army as their control of the battle space is expanded. A summary of the equipment includes: Communications-Electronics - Includes signal items such as radio, telephone, satellite, avionics, marine communications and navigational equipment; tactical and non-tactical Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE); radar; photographic, audiovisual, and television equipment; and electronic sensors. These capabilities will allow the Iraqi Army to do more with less in the future.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 105	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 106	Additional Regional Support Unit			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				36.5	
<p><b>Description:</b> Currently, the Iraqi Army is unable to fully meet contingencies, due to its incomplete objective logistics structure, and because planned capabilities were not designed to support deployments of forces of battalion size or greater. These capability shortfalls hinder not only operations in the counter-insurgency environment but also leave the Iraqi Army logistically vulnerable if attacked. These funds procure the necessary equipment for a Regional Support Unit. By adding a Regional Support Unit, the tactical and operational depth of their logistical systems will increase dramatically.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. At present, the Iraqi Army is geographically fixed and requires extensive Coalition support when asked to depart home bases, as in support of Fard Al Qanoon. This will improve significantly when regional support units reach full operational capability. Regional support units and other logistics enhancements will allow the ISF to support complex tactical operations over an extended period of time.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
		MNSTC-I 106			

APPROPRIATION				BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND						October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD		
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 107	Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ				
				FY 2008		
COST (in millions)				164.2		
<p><b>Description:</b> This Brigade will provide the Iraqi Army with three operational Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) battalions and one headquarters battalion to provide command and control for the brigade. The "ISOF Brigade will assume special operations duties in the war against insurgents, terrorists and foreign incursion. This includes funding for setting up a headquarters element to coordinate operations, personnel supplies and training. This funding will provide basic equipment according to the Military Table of Equipment for the basic outfitting of a special forces battalion. Equipment includes items such as survivability, counter-mobility &amp; mobility enhancements, explosive ordnance disposal, bulk water production &amp; storage, bulk fuel storage &amp; distribution, offices, barracks/dorms, mess halls, bay and shops, facilities, ranges, Central Issue Facility (CIF), helipad, ammunition, igloos, fuel storage tanks, etc.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.</p>						
		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40	
		MNSTC-I 107				

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 108	Engineering IED Defeat			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				253.7	
<p><b>Description:</b> Enhanced engineering capabilities are an integral part of a combined arms unit's ability to maneuver and defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). It is focused on the support of close combat forces. Light engineers maintain critical tools and equipment as well as demolition materials. As squads or platoon, light engineers move as part of the light infantry formation. Capable of using fire and movement techniques, they also contribute employing demolition and fire to a close-combat fight. In Iraq, Light Engineer Companies will be effective at removing obstacles placed by insurgents such as road blocks as well as building defensive positions. The equipment required will be suited for light construction, which will include bulldozers, cranes and light excavators. Sustainment of the equipment funding for these units will provide engineers the ability to enhance the force momentum by physically shaping the area of operations (AO) to make the most efficient use of space and time to generate mass and speed while denying the enemy maneuver.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is needed in order to counter the roadside bomb threat; the Iraqi Engineer Company in each Division should be equipped with a route clearance capability robust and redundant enough to weight the main effort within each Division sector. Without this capability to provide Route clearance will prolong US troops in theater currently performing this mission.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO.	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
		MNSTC-I 108			



APPROPRIATION				BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND						October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD		
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 109	Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)				
				FY 2008		
COST (in millions)				120.0		
<p><b>Description:</b> This capability (eight aircraft) is necessary to transfer the counter terrorism fight to the Iraqi Air Force. Specifically, this platform will assist the Iraqi Air Force in working with the Iraqi Army to transfer Special Operations troops in no-notice situations. The capability must be in place by FY 2008 to meet milestones in accordance with the Coalition Campaign action plan. The modification of these units is expected to be 9 to 10 months so immediate action must be taken to fund and implement this FMS case. These aircraft will be based at Taji. The consequence of not funding this critical enabler would result in prolonged US involvement in the COIN fight.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is need by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlines in the Campaign Plan. This capability is necessary to transfer the counter terrorism fight to the Iraqi Air Force. Specifically, this platform will assist the Iraqi Air Force in working with the Iraqi Army to transfer Special Operations troops in no-notice situations.</p>						
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 110	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40	

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 110	Rotary Wing, 16 Additional Helicopters			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				82.5	
<p><b>Description:</b> This funding provides the Iraqi Air Force with helicopters that will be used for battlefield mobility and flight training, both of which are essential capabilities for transition from the Coalition to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Battlefield Mobility is a key enabler in the fight against terrorism. These capabilities will allow the Iraqi Air Force to move ISF to the point of impact quickly and provide overwhelming force to combat the insurgency.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) Campaign Plan. Without this capability to find, fix, track, target and kill the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 110	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 111	Expand from 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions			
					FY 2008
COST (in millions)					3.5
<p><b>Description:</b> Iraqi Training Battalions are necessary for individual, job specific training (occupational specialties). Each Iraqi training battalion will be capable to teaching up to 8 occupational specialty course, most of which will be logistical specialties. This is necessary to support the training base expansion plan, which will increase the overall size of the Iraqi Army.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> If not funded, the Iraqi Army will not be able to support upgrades in all other mentioned areas, preventing pull-out of U.S. support and prolonging the war on terror.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 111	PAGE NO.	EXHIBIT P-40	

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 112	Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				1.8	
<p><b>Description:</b> Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment for school training is critical in Iraq for the purpose of dismantling and removing improvised explosive devices placed by insurgents. EOD personnel greatly improve combat effectiveness by maintaining the forward momentum of Iraqi units while simultaneously reducing the impact of the insurgent's most powerful weapon. There will be one EOD company per Iraqi division that can be split into small teams capable of covering large areas. This funding provides the Iraqi Army with the capability of training mission focused motivated ordnance officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers, who are technically competent in munitions management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, electronic and missile maintenance, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment arenas. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and extensive practical exercises.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is outlined in the Coalition plan to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.</p>					
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 112	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40

APPROPRIATION				BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND						October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD		
Ministry of Defence	MNSTC-I 113	Increase Engineering School Capacity				
				FY 2008		
COST (in millions)				1.8		
<p><b>Description:</b> The Engineer School is located at Camp Taji and it must increase capacity in order to support force generation. The school is completed operated by the Iraqis with little coalition oversight. Their mission is to train engineers that are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movement. The engineers improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the IA. Training requirements will be heavily involved in explosives and tactical movements. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and extensive practical exercises.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is outlined in the Coalition plan to meet the counter terrorism milestones outline in the Campaign Plan. Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.</p>						
		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 113	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40	

APPROPRIATION			BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET		DATE
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND					October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY	LINE ITEM	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE		SUBHEAD	
Ministry of Defense	MNSTC-I 114	Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)			
				FY 2008	
COST (in millions)				105.2	
<p><b>Description:</b> In order to meet initial operational capabilities for the Airlift and VIP transport it is critical that the Iraqi Air Force has a fleet of 6 light transport aircraft to move Iraqi Special Operations Forces quickly and over the distance of the country. This capability is needed in various bases to move Quick Reaction Force to area of impact. This capability is needed in 2008 in order to meet the initial operational capabilities for airlift capability. The VIP movement is also critical in order to get government officials to a particular location to show the Iraqi people that the government is in contact and has the capability to respond to occurring situations.</p> <p><b>Impact if not provided:</b> This critical enabler is needed in 2008 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlines in the Campaign Plan. Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.</p>					
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### C. Training

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Training:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Defense Forces Training	50,000	-50,000	0
Aircrew Training	27,000	-27,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	10,500	10,500
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	600	600
Ammunition Supply Point	0	600	600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	1,600	1,600
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	400	400
Add Regional Support Unit	0	5,400	5,400
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	23,100	23,100
Engineering IED Defeat	0	4,800	4,800
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	3,700	3,700
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	5,600	5,600
Expand 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions	0	1,500	1,500
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	600	600
Ministerial Capacity	0	50,000	50,000
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	600	600
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	7,100	7,100
<b>Subtotal, Training</b>	<b>77,000</b>	<b>39,100</b>	<b>116,100</b>

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Support Battalion \$ 10.5M

**Narrative Justification:** The "ISOF Support Battalion" will be a large "Regional Support Unit" (like a US Army Area Support Group) that will assume the installation life support and sustainment mission. This support unit will provide needed logistical support for the expanded ISOF forces as the IRAQ ISOF forces grow and U.S. support logistical support wanes. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development to include counter-terrorism, commando techniques, and special reconnaissance using job specific equipment.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in late 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide training for these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the Counter Insurgency.



## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Enhance Division Logistics Planning \$ 0.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Division Logistics (G4) has coordinating staff responsibility for logistic planning. They develop division-level plans, policies, and priorities. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using the job specific equipment as this organic organizational level supply capability is brought online to support the Iraqi Army. Training will include logistical automation, operational plans & policies, and modern inventory and distribution techniques.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this operational logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Ammunition Supply Point \$ 0.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) will operate as close to the division's rear boundary as possible, while facilitating a maximum turn-around time of 4 to 4 1/2 hours for unit re-supply vehicles. The ASP will maintain a stockage of high-volume munitions and ammunition for units located in the supported division's area. The ASPs are operated by one of the corps level support unit and direct support ammunition companies. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and extensive practical exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Mobile Maintenance Capability within Mobile Transportation Regiment (MTR) \$ 1.6M**

**Narrative Justification:** To expand Iraqi Army Logistics capability, we need to add a mobile maintenance capability to the Motor Transportation Regiment. Currently, when an Iraqi vehicle breaks down, they rely on either Coalition Forces to come and make repairs, or the vehicle must be brought to an existing maintenance facility. The Iraqi Army needs the training necessary to make repairs on the move. Contact Trucks and Field Workshops are critical to creating a mobile reactive force that can respond in a changing environment. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using the job specific equipment and involve extensive practical exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Communication Repair Section in Regional Support Units (RSUs) \$ 0.4M**

**Narrative Justification:** To expand Iraqi Army Logistics capability, capability for repairing communications equipment is being added at the regional support units. Currently, when Iraqi vehicle communications systems breaks down, they rely on either Coalition Forces to come and make repairs, or the vehicle must be brought to an existing maintenance facility. The Iraqi Army needs the training necessary to make repairs on the move. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using the job specific equipment. As modern communications equipment is added, the burden of training Iraqis on maintenance becomes even more critical. Without proper training, all of the investments in modern communications equipment will be short lived.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Additional Regional Support Units \$ 5.4M

**Narrative Justification:** The Iraqi military is currently unable to flex to meet contingencies both because its objective logistics structure is incomplete, and also because the planned capabilities were not designed to support deployments of battalion size or greater forces. These capability shortfalls hinder not only operations in the COIN environment but also leave Iraqi vulnerable logistically if attacked conventionally. By adding a Regional Support Unit, it will increase the tactical and operational depth of the logistics system. This, in conjunction with the significant increase in the manning of the Support Command, will round out the Iraqi logistics force. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and involve extensive exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. At present, the Iraqi Army is geographically fixed and requires such extensive Coalition support that when required to depart home bases (as in support of Operation Fard Al Qanoon), they are unable to support their own troop movements. This will improve significantly when regional support units reach full operational capability. Regional Support Units and other logistics enhancements will allow the ISF to support complex tactical operations over an extended period of time.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ) \$ 23.1M**

**Narrative Justification:** ISOF Brigade is established including 3 ISOF battalions and a headquarters battalion to command and control the regional expansion companies. These subordinate Battalions will provide an advanced capability in the counter insurgency fight. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment. Individual training will be conducted primarily at the Iraqi Army Service Support Institute (IASSI).

**Impact if not provided:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the Counter Insurgency.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Engineering IED Defeat \$ 4.8M

**Narrative Justification:** To counter the roadside bomb threat, the Iraqi Engineer Company in each Division should be equipped with a route clearance capability robust and redundant enough to support the main effort within each Division sector. The training funds will provide instruction for 6 engineering companies and support over 1,000 people. This line item is critical in defeating an enemy that is heavily involved in non-conventional warfare. The engineers are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movements. The engineers will improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the IA. Route Clearance operations are intended to maintain freedom of tactical maneuver and operational movement. Infrastructure will be required to effectively double existing capabilities throughout the Iraqi Army. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and involve extensive practical exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed in order to counter the roadside bomb threat (Improvised Explosive Device Defeat); the Iraqi Engineer Company in each Division should be equipped with a route clearance capability robust and redundant enough to weight the main effort within each Division sector. Without this capability to provide Route clearance, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### **Training / Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters) \$ 3.7M**

**Narrative Justification:** Counter-terrorism-specific modifications should include the MX-15 EO/IR sensors, ALE/AAR-47 defensive systems as chosen for the Iraqi ISR aircraft, forward-firing machine guns and rockets, and an improved navigation suite utilizing multifunctional display cockpit instrumentation. This is a critical enabler to find, fix, target and kill insurgent forces acting against the population or ISF. Infrastructure will be enhanced at Kirkuk and Taji AB for both training crews and maintenance of aircraft. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment. Individual training will be conducted primarily at the Iraqi Army Service Support Institute (IASSI).

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Campaign Plan. This capability is necessary to transfer the counter terrorism fight to the Iraqi Air Force. Specifically, this platform will assist the Iraqi Air Force in working with the Iraqi Army to transfer Special Operations troops in no-notice situations.



## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopter \$ 5.6M

**Narrative Justification:** These helicopters will be used for battlefield mobility and flight training, both of which are essential capabilities to transition to the Iraqi Air Force immediately. Battlefield Mobility is a key enabler in the fight against terrorism. The Iraqi Air Force must be able to move ISF to the point of impact quickly to provide overwhelming force to combat the insurgency and show the Iraqi people the government is in control and will protect them against the insurgent forces. Eight (8) of these aircraft will be based at Kirkuk, and eight (8) will be based at Taji.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key ISOF assets and destroy the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Expand 2 to 6 Iraqi Training Battalions \$ 1.5M**

**Narrative Justification:** Iraqi Training Battalions are necessary for individual, job specific training (occupational specialties). Each Iraqi training battalion will be capable to teaching up to 8 occupational specialty courses, most of which will be logistical specialties. This is necessary to support the training base expansion plan, which will increase the overall size of the Iraqi Army. This funding will provide for training materials, equipment and course of instruction to establish these fledgling schools.

**Impact if not provided:** Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### **Training / Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity \$ 0.6M**

**Narrative Justification:** Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment for school training is critical in Iraq for the purpose of dismantling and removing improvised explosive devices placed by insurgents. EOD personnel greatly improve combat effectiveness by maintaining the forward momentum of Iraqi units while simultaneously reducing the impact of the insurgent's most powerful weapon. There will be one EOD company per Iraqi division that can be split into small teams capable of covering large areas. This funding provides the Iraqi Army with the capability of training mission focused motivated ordnance officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers, who are technically competent in munitions management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, electronic and missile maintenance, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment arenas. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and extensive practical exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Ministerial Capacity \$ 50.0M

**Narrative Justification:** Ministerial capacity development (\$50M) is the concentrated effort to develop institutional capabilities at senior managerial levels within the Ministry of Defence (MoD). US Government partners, led by MNSTC-I's Transition Teams (TTs), specifically focus on building and developing ministerial capabilities in Logistics (maintenance/ supply/ distribution), Personnel, Finance, Contracting and Medical specialties within the Ministry and Subordinate organizational levels. The TT's mission continues to grow and many of the required skill sets are best matched by civilian contractors, especially those with police or police related experience. This requirement continues to develop institutional capabilities at senior managerial levels through the training and consultation of leadership to enhance the ministerial capacity of the MoD. The importance of maintaining the appropriate level of mentorship by highly skilled contractor personnel as the U.S. Military draws-down cannot be overstated. This funding will ensure adequate continuity is maintained as the Iraqi Security Forces transition to self-sufficiency. Outputs include standard policies, formulated strategic plans, and managerial practices and procedures to assist in the Ministry's management processes. Without the additional \$50 million, maintenance of institutional capabilities will cease, and the development of the Ministry's senior leaders managing the Iraqi Security Forces will be degraded.

**Impact if not provided:** The MoD's ability to assume strategic planning and programming responsibilities supporting the on-going Counter-Insurgency (COIN) mission will be delayed which will result in Coalition Forces remaining in place for an additional period of time. The employed contract personnel possess invaluable institutional knowledge regarding police-related activities, governmental procedures, and managerial processes required to ensure successful transition and assumption of governmental roles by MoD leaders and senior managers. If this capability is not continued, the MoD will have to depend on the Coalition to assume this responsibility.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Increase Engineering School Capacity \$ 0.6M**

**Narrative Justification:** The Engineer School is located at Camp Taji and it must increase capacity in order to support force generation. The school is completed operated by the Iraqis with little coalition oversight. Their mission is to train engineers that are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movement. The engineers improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the IA. Training requirements will be heavily involved in explosives and tactical movements. Training will include in-depth, hands-on technical development using job specific equipment and extensive practical exercises.

**Impact if not provided:** Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350) \$ 7.1M**

**Narrative Justification:** General fixed wing training will be conducted at either Kirkuk AB or New Al Muthana AB for 24 pilots per year. Initial qualification for new pilots will take two years. Training for former pilots will last three months. Mission qualification for all pilots will be an additional one to three months. Training will also be conducted for an undetermined number of crew chiefs and will last six to twelve months.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed in 2008 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key ISOF assets and kill the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## D. Sustainment

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Sustainment:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Taji National Depot Operations	115,000	-115,000	0
Naval Maintenance	20,000	-20,000	0
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Support Battalion	0	3,500	3,500
Enhance Division Logistics Planning	0	1,000	1,000
Ammunition Supply Point	0	1,600	1,600
Mobile Maintenance Capability within MTR	0	9,500	9,500
Communication Repair Section in RSUs	0	4,600	4,600
Add Regional Support Unit	0	12,700	12,700
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ)	0	23,200	23,200
Engineering IED Defeat	0	57,100	57,100
Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters)	0	12,000	12,000
Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters	0	18,000	18,000
Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity	0	600	600
Increase Engineering School Capacity	0	600	600
Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350)	0	10,300	10,300
<b>Subtotal, Sustainment</b>	<b>135,000</b>	<b>19,700</b>	<b>154,700</b>

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Support Battalion \$ 3.5M

**Narrative Justification:** The "ISOF Support Battalion "will be a large "Regional Support Unit" (like a US Army Area Support Group) that will assume the installation life support and sustainment mission. This support unit will provide needed logistical support for the expanded ISOF forces as the IRAQ ISOF forces grow and U.S. logistical support is reduced. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year. These units will not draw sustainment from parent numbered division infrastructure but may draw from MOD depots.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National –Iraq Force initiative to improve ISOF’s mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister’s objectives to defeat the Counter Insurgency.



## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Enhance Division Logistics Planning \$ 1.0M

**Narrative Justification:** The Division Logistics (G4) has coordinating staff responsibility for logistic planning. They develop division-level plans, policies, and priorities. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. This higher echelon support strikes at the heart of what Iraqi forces are missing. Their previous military structure was largely configured for a “fight in place” mission. The upper level logistical support over watch that was established was largely vacant following the demise of the last regime. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Ammunition Supply Point \$ 1.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) will operate as close to the division's rear boundary as possible, while facilitating a maximum turn-around time of 4 to 4 1/2 hours for unit re-supply vehicles. In order to meet these goals, it was determined that Iraq would need at least three additional locations. The ASP will maintain a stockage of high-volume munitions and ammunition for units located in the supported division's area. The ASPs are operated by one of the corps level support unit and direct support ammunition companies. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. This is another key area in the plan to rebuild Iraqi logistical infrastructure. If not provided, ammunition re-supply will either not function, or will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Mobile Maintenance Capability within Mobile Transportation Regiment (MTR) \$ 9.5M

**Narrative Justification:** To expand Iraqi Army Logistics capability, a mobile maintenance capability must be added to the MTR. Currently, when an Iraqi vehicle breaks down, they rely on either Coalition Forces to come and make repairs, or the vehicle must be brought to an existing maintenance facility. The Iraqi Army needs the equipment necessary to make repairs on the move. Contact Trucks and Field Workshops are critical to creating a mobile reactive force that can respond in a changing and developing environment. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this critical logistical support requirement, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces. Large quantities of U.S. and Iraqi purchased vehicles will be left where they break down. A force readiness and mission support requirement, the MoD must develop this capability for organic support within the Iraq military structure.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Communication Repair Section in Regional Support Units (RSUs) \$ 4.6M

**Narrative Justification:** To expand Iraqi Army logistics and maintenance capability, a Communications Repair capability is needed. Currently, when Iraqi vehicle communications break down, they rely on either Coalition Forces to come and make repairs, or the vehicle must be taken to an existing maintenance facility. The Iraqi Army needs sustainment support for this project to make repairs on the move. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. If not provided, Iraqi units will continue to rely on U.S. forces for this logistical and maintenance support, preventing withdrawal of U.S. Forces. Large investments of U.S. funds for supplying The Ministry of Defence with communications equipment will be wasted unless they develop the capability to repair the equipment they do have. Currently, they operate equipment until it breaks and then it must be shelved or is discarded.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Additional Regional Support Unit (RSU) \$ 12.7M

**Narrative Justification:** The Iraqi military is currently unable to flex to meet contingencies both because its objective logistics structure is incomplete, and also because the planned capabilities were not designed to support deployments of forces of battalion size or greater. These capability shortfalls hinder not only operations in the COIN environment but also leave the Iraqi Security Forces vulnerable logistically if attacked in a conventional manner. By adding a Regional Support Unit, the tactical and operational depth of the logistics system will expand to provide that support. This, in conjunction with the significant increase in the manning of the Support Command, will round out the Iraqi logistics force. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** The Iraqi Security Forces will not have the capability to logistically support their operations, thus restricting the ability of the military to defeat the counter insurgency. At present, the Iraqi Army is geographically fixed and requires extensive Coalition support when asked to depart home bases, as in support of Operation Fard Al Qanoon (Baghdad Security Plan). This will improve significantly when Regional Support Units reach full operational capability. Regional Support Units and other logistical enhancements will allow the ISF to support complex tactical operations over an extended period of time.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade & HQ (3 SOF BN/1HQ) \$ 23.2M

**Narrative Justification:** ISOF Brigade is established, including 3 ISOF battalions and a headquarters battalion, to command and control the regional expansion companies. These subordinate operational battalions will provide an advanced capability in the counter insurgency fight. Sustainment will provide for all life support needs through the first year of operations. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility for all life support for all associated units. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** Iraqi Special Operations Forces Expansion was initiated in 2006 as a Prime Minister and Multi-National Force initiative to improve ISOF's mobility and operational agility. Failure to provide these forces will prevent achievement of the Prime Minister's objectives and prolong the Counter Insurgency.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Engineering IED Defeat \$ 57.1M

**Narrative Justification:** Enhanced engineering capabilities are an integral part of a combined arms unit's ability to maneuver and defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). It is focused on the support of close combat forces. Light engineers maintain critical tools and equipment as well as demolition materials. As squads or platoons, light engineers move as part of the light infantry formation. Capable of using fire and movement techniques, they also contribute employing demolition and fire to a close-combat fight. In Iraq, Light Engineer Companies will be effective at removing obstacles placed by insurgents such as road blocks as well as building defensive positions. The equipment required will be suited for light construction, which will include bulldozers, cranes and light excavators. Sustainment of the equipment funding for these units will provide engineers the ability to enhance the force momentum by physically shaping the area of operations (AO) to make the most efficient use of space and time to generate mass and speed while denying the enemy maneuver. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year. This is currently provided by life support contractors, but the Iraqi Army is moving toward a self-reliance concept that will make them self-sufficient.

**Impact if not provided:** Without this organic capability, Iraqi forces will continue to rely on support U.S. forces in bringing the fight to insurgents throughout Iraq.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Counter Terror/COIN (Special Helicopters) \$ 12.0M

**Narrative Justification:** These eight (8) aircraft are to be upgraded from the standard design used in the configuration of the 16 previously upgraded Iraqi Helicopters IIs. Counter-terrorism-specific modifications should include the MX-15 EO/IR sensors, ALE/AAR-47 defensive systems as chosen for the Iraqi ISR aircraft, forward-firing machine guns and rockets, and an improved navigation suite utilizing multifunctional display cockpit instrumentation. This is a critical enabler to find, fix, target and kill insurgent forces acting against the population or ISF. Sustainment support to infrastructure will be enhanced at Kirkuk and Taji AB for both training crews for maintenance of aircraft. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by Feb 08 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) Campaign Plan. This capability is necessary to transfer the counter terrorism fight to the Iraqi Air Force. Specifically, this platform will assist the Iraqi Air Force in working with Iraqi Army units to transfer Special Operations troops in no-notice situations.



## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Rotary Wing 16 Additional Helicopters \$ 18.0M

**Narrative Justification:** These 16 helicopters will be used for battlefield mobility and flight training, both of which are essential capabilities to transition to the Iraqi Army ASAP. Battlefield Mobility is a key enabler in the fight against terrorism. The Iraqi Army must be able to move ISF to the point of impact quickly to provide overwhelming force to combat the insurgency and show the Iraqi people the government is in control and will protect them against the insurgent forces. 8 of these aircraft will be based at Kirkuk and 8 aircraft will be based at Taji. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by the first quarter of 2008 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) assets to destroy insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Increase Explosive Ordnance Disposal School Capacity \$ 0.6M

**Narrative Justification:** Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) equipment for school training is critical in Iraq for the purpose of dismantling and removing improvised explosive devices (IED) placed by insurgents. The EOD personnel greatly improve combat effectiveness by maintaining the forward momentum of Iraqi units while simultaneously reducing the impact of the insurgent's most powerful weapon. There will be one EOD company per Iraqi division that can be split into small teams capable of covering large areas. This sustainment funding provides the Iraqi Army with the capability of producing mission focused motivated ordnance officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers, who are technically competent in munitions management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, electronic and missile maintenance, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment arenas. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** Without the capacity to sustain expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission. This meets the goals of the Joint Campaign Plan.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Increase Engineering School Capacity \$ 0.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Engineer School is located at Camp Taji and it must increase capacity in order to support force generation. Their mission is to train engineers that are capable of removing obstacles and hazards that could stop a convoy or other tactical movement. The engineers improve flexibility, mobility and safety of the IA. Sustaining the training requirements will involve explosives and tactical movements. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** Without this capacity to train expanded military assets to fight the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission. It will also not meet the Coalition Joint Campaign Plan.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Fixed Wing Transport (King Air 350) \$ 10.3M

**Narrative Justification:** This project will develop the basic core sustainment needed to train and provide support for the Iraqi Air Force to move Iraq Special Operations Forces (ISOF) and Very Important People (VIPs) quickly throughout Iraq. This project complements the previous acquisition of six (6) King Air 350 transport planes. This funding will pay for the first quarter of sustainment. After that, Iraq will assume responsibility.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, habitability, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission through the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is needed by first quarter of 2008 in order to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the Campaign Plan. Without the capability to move key ISOF assets and kill the insurgency, US troops will have to remain in theater to continue performing this mission.

## VII. Ministry of Interior - Revised FY 2008 Budget Submission

Although significant progress has been achieved in the last 4 years, capability gaps have been identified in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). MNF-I and MNC-I, through the Transition Readiness Assessment process as well as through the reporting of the military transition teams, have validated those capability gaps. These areas of identified ISF weakness include: lack of maneuver capabilities; tactical mobility and deployability; sustainment; tactical and operational command and control; fire power; reconnaissance and intelligence; survivability; and combat overmatch. Currently, these gaps are satisfied by Coalition Forces. This assessment is supported by a Center for Army Analysis (CAA) study and other recent capability and force structure reviews. If not addressed, these gaps will require Coalition Forces to remain in support of the counter insurgency fight, or greatly increase the long-term vulnerability of the ISF after the redeployment of Coalition tactical and support units. Growing the ISF and implementing recommended adaptations will enable the Government of Iraq (GoI) to assume many Coalition responsibilities by the end of 2008. After extensive research and analysis, the following specific Ministry of Interior capabilities have been identified for United States Government (USG) funding, as part of a defined ISF growth package. Funding support for the entire force growth package will be shared between the USG and the GoI.

### Ministry of Interior Forces, BA-2

(Dollars in Thousands)	Original Request	Delta	Revised Request
<b>Infrastructure</b>	-	<b>+84,700</b>	<b>84,700</b>
<b>Equipment &amp; Transportation</b>	<b>245,000</b>	<b>+147,000</b>	<b>392,000</b>
<b>Training</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>+123,300</b>	<b>623,300</b>
<b>Sustainment</b>	-	<b>+106,000</b>	<b>106,000</b>
<b>TOTAL MOI</b>	<b>745,000</b>	<b>+461,000</b>	<b>1,206,000</b>

**A. Infrastructure**

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Infrastructure:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	30,500	30,500
Carabinieri-like Training	0	8,000	8,000
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	46,200	46,200
<b>Subtotal, Infrastructure</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>84,700</b>	<b>84,700</b>

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** IqA – Ministry of Interior

**Project:** Re-train Iraqi Police

**Location:** TBD

**Amount:** \$ 30.5 million

**Description/Justification:** In order to meet the Expanded Training Base goals for the Iraqi Police expansion plan, this requirement supports two critical infrastructure areas: first, an expanded Police Training Academy specifically for the Baghdad area in order to increase training capacity; and second, to renovate/expand existing structures and execute new construction for up to a total of 31 police stations at various locations around Baghdad (exact locations yet to be determined). With the increase in the numbers of trained police will come a critical need for police stations to work out of. Police forces have nearly doubled, yet infrastructure has remained static. This plan supports 75% of the total requirement, with remaining needs phased into FY09. Construction to be completed in 2008 will also be supported by the Ministry of Interior on a 50% cost share basis using FMS.

**Impact if not provided:** Their police at present have only basic training in all phases of their profession. As the force grows, a professional force can take over and allow U.S. forces to re-deploy. Cutting resources for this requirement will create a critical gap in the fight against insurgents, terrorists and sectarian violence and coercion currently plaguing Iraq. This more broad based approach will provide the opportunity for larger numbers of Iraqi police forces to receive professional organized training and establish a baseline of knowledge and expectations of a professional force willing to uphold the rule of law, and possessing state of the art tools/techniques against an ever adapting and resourceful enemy.

## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** IqA – Ministry of Interior

**Project:** Carabinieri-like Training

**Location:** Camp Dublin

**Amount:** \$ 8.0 million

**Description/Justification:** The Carabinieri of Italy are some of the most respected law enforcement professionals in the western world. It is the goal of this program to utilize their recognized expertise in law enforcement and counter terrorism as a model for an elite Iraqi police force. Through efforts of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, the Italian Carabinieri will share their training techniques with the Iraqi National Police. Currently there is a two-year plan to train Iraqi National Police leadership. Eight to twelve battalions of national police will train at Camp Dublin, close to the Baghdad International Airport. Each course will last three months and will initially be staffed by about 40 Carabinieri in training and support roles. This program includes a two-year plan to train Iraqi National Police leadership. These funds will specifically fund the construction of facilities such as the school house, barracks and training range facilities.

- a. School Facilities at Camp Dublin
- b. Training Ranges
- c. Barracks for Trainees

**Impact if not provided:** Cutting resources for this requirement will create a critical gap in the fight against insurgents, terrorists, sectarian violence and coercion currently plaguing Iraq. This is an opportunity to take step forward, past historical limitations and pre-conceived ideals held by many Iraqis in the creation of a professional force willing to uphold the rule of law, and possessing state of the art tools/techniques against an ever adapting and resourceful enemy.



## **INFRASTRUCTURE EXHIBIT**

**Component:** IqP – Ministry of Interior

**Project:** Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment

**Location:** TBD

**Amount:** \$ 46.2 million

**Description/Justification:** The increase of personnel for Iraqi Police is critical for the achievement of a strong police corps for Iraq. Along with the current Emergency Response Units, there is a need for more specialized training within police units. The expansion in units will add personnel with specialized “Special Weapons and Tactics” or SWAT teams. Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordinance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counter-terrorism task force coordination.

- a. Police Station Facility improvements/enlargement/renovations as required by police force growth at each specific location
- b. Force Protection Improvements to ensure that these vital assets are maintained safely

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource this requirement will prevent this from moving forward. Constrained facilities do not provide the proper amount of work area for police to receive the public, conduct initial investigative efforts, protect arms and equipment and provide adequate rest areas for assigned police forces. Without upgrades/growth police stations will be insufficient to meet the security needs of the country.

## **B. Equipment and Transportation**

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Equipment and Transportation:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
General Office Automation	40,000	-40,000	0
Objective Civil Securty Forces (OCSF)	205,000	-205,000	0
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	60,100	60,100
Carabinieri-like Training	0	18,600	18,600
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	186,300	186,300
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	1,500	1,500
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	36,000	36,000
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	89,500	89,500
<b>Subtotal, Equipment and Transportation</b>	<b>245,000</b>	<b>147,000</b>	<b>392,000</b>

APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 201	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE Re-train Iraqi Police		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				60.1

**Description:** The Iraqi Police (IP) is composed of patrol and station police, as well, as specialists such as forensic specialists, assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Militia influence of local police remains a significant problem; however, Prime Minister Maliki has demonstrated a commitment to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with criminal gangs. A summary of equipment includes Operation Equipment: Tactical and urban ambulances, equipment and cleaning kits, generator, pistol (9mm), rifle (AK-47), 4WD pickup, radios, unmarked sedan, telephone (cellular and Voice Over Internet Protocol), medium cargo- Organizational Equipment: Filing cabinets, binoculars, digital cameras, fuel cans, computer lap/desktop, copier, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, flashlight, fax/scanner machine, printer, weapons rack, combination safe, electrical/mechanical tool kits, camouflage/mosquito net, concertina wire and long pickets- Consumable equipment: Ammunition and handcuffs- Individual Equipment: Duffle and laundry bags, duty and rigger belts, boots, caps, Booney hats, parka coat, Kevlar helmet, BDU pants. Leather gloves, Small-Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, body armor vest, BDU and tee shirts, magazine pouch, physical training shorts and socks. Equipment funding for retraining the IP is critical in the fight against the insurgency, it will provide the IP with proper training to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level.

**Impact if not provided:** Not resourcing this requirement will leave the Police lacking critical funds to provide for a reliable, non-sectarian force. While the police force is growing in numbers, they have lost many "Experienced" professionals with experience gained from whole careers in the law enforcement profession. It will also leave the Iraqi Police dependent upon Coalition Forces to fill logistical and operational gaps. Requirements such as supplies, weapons, ammunition, transportation, and field services functions will leave the Iraqi Police without the proper equipment to continue the fight against the insurgency.

		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 201	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
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APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 202	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE Carabinieri-like Training		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				18.6

**Description:** The Carabinieri of Italy are some of the most respected law enforcement professionals in the western world. The goal of this program is to utilize their recognized expertise in law enforcement and counter terrorism as a model for an elite Iraqi police force. Through efforts of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, the Italian Carabinieri will share their training techniques with the Iraqi National Police. Equipment funding for this request will help establish the Iraqi National Police as a professional military force, filling the gap between police and armed forces. Currently there is a two-year plan to train the Iraqi National Police leadership. Eight to twelve battalions of Iraqi National Police will train at Camp Dublin, close to the Baghdad International Airport. Each course will last three months and will initially be staffed by about 40 Carabinieri in training and support roles. Equipment for this training will be used to focus primarily on counterinsurgency methods and forensic investigation to help the Iraqi Police fight the terrorism they face daily.

**Impact if not provided:** This critical enabler is outlined in the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) plan to meet the counter terrorism milestones outlined in the CPATT Campaign Plan. Without this capability to move key assets and eliminate the insurgency, US troops in theater currently performing this mission will be prolonged.

		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 202	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
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APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 203	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				186.3

**Description:** Iraqi Police Expansion is critical in the creation of a unified Iraq. This funding provides individual and unit police equipment required by each new recruit to maintain law and order, to pursue insurgents and militia and maintain security in their areas of responsibility. Current estimates Iraqi Police total growth at 50K across Iraq with more possible. Procurement of equipment will include individual police gear and unit/station equipment to include weapons, personal protective gear, uniforms, restraint devices/systems, communications equipment, basic record keeping equipment, night sticks/collapsible batons, flashlights, and other non-lethal devices.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource this requirement will prevent this ground breaking alliance between existing police and tribal leaders from moving forward. This initiative has the potential to cut through the fog of sectarian violence and begin the movement towards a unified and united Iraqi Security Forces.

		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 203	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
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APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 204	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE DBE HQ National Command and Control		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				1.5

**Description:** The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) allow for the legal, controlled, entry of people and goods into Iraq. The DBE serves a source of revenue and a way to track immigration and visitation. Equipment funding for this requirement will allow the Customs Police to command Iraq's borders by using cutting edge technological systems used to detect contraband, explosives, and weapons. Currently, the force is in the process of creating a nationwide database that will help control immigration, track terrorist and criminal activities. A summary of equipment includes Operation Equipment: Tactical and urban ambulances, equipment and cleaning kits, generator, pistol (9mm), rifle (AK-47), 4WD pickup, radios, unmarked sedan, telephone (cellular and Voice Over Internet Protocol), medium cargo- Organizational Equipment: Filing cabinets, binoculars, digital cameras, fuel cans, computer lap/desktop, copier, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, flashlight, fax/scanner machine, printer, weapons rack, combination safe, electrical/mechanical tool kits, camouflage/mosquito net, concertina wire and long pickets- Consumable equipment: Ammunition and handcuffs- Individual Equipment: Duffle and laundry bags, duty and rigger belts, boots, caps, Booney hats, parka coat, Kevlar helmet, BDU pants. Leather gloves, Small-Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, body armor vest, BDU and tee shirts, magazine pouch, physical training shorts and socks. Through a fully funded equipment program, all nineteen ports around the country will have the capability to ease the flow of trade between Iraq and the rest of the world.

**Impact if not provided:** If not provided, the DBE will not have the equipment capabilities to fully control immigration, track terrorist and criminal activities, detect contraband, explosives and weapons entering the country of Iraq.

		P-1 ITEM NO. MNSTC-I 204	PAGE NO.		EXHIBIT P-40
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APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 205	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				36.0

**Description:** Iraq's National Police play an important role in re-establishing law and order in areas of conflict, a task well suited to their purpose, training and capabilities. Due to numerous factors, there is ongoing MoI and Coalition planning to expand the training capacity country wide. This entails constructing or expanding capacity at up to 15 different training locations. The funds will be used for equipment needed to support the training of the personnel going through the training. A partnership deal will enable the Iraqis to build capacity that will allow Iraqis to train enough policemen to start the process to transitioning control from Coalition Forces.

**Impact if not provided:** The current capacity of the MOI to produce police is inadequate. At the rate Iraq is currently increasing capacity and with the attrition rates that the security forces experience on an annual basis, the MOI will not be able to train enough forces to meet the immediate needs for approximately 32 years. This is not sufficient to meet the immediate security needs of the country.

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APPROPRIATION JUSTIFICATION SHEET IRAQI SECURITY FORCES FUND		BUDGET ITEM		DATE October 2007
BUDGET ACTIVITY Ministry of Interior	LINE ITEM MNSTC-I 206	P-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment		SUBHEAD
				FY 2008
COST (in millions)				89.5

**Description:** This funding provides new personnel, currently estimated at 50K across Iraq, with the required and professional development and equipment necessary to safely maintain law and order, which will be similar Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.. Both patrol and police stations need these life saving and basic survival skills to ensure the citizenry and the police are protected.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource this requirement will prevent this ground breaking alliance from moving forward. This initiative has the potential to cut through the fog of sectarian violence and begin the movement towards a unified and united Iraqi Security Forces.

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### C. Training

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Training:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	17,000	17,000
Carabinieri-like Training	0	13,600	13,600
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	58,400	58,400
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract	450,000	-50,000	400,000
Ministerial Capacity Development	50,000	0	50,000
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	3,600	3,600
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	16,800	16,800
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	63,900	63,900
<b>Subtotal, Training</b>	<b>500,000</b>	<b>123,300</b>	<b>623,300</b>

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Re-train Iraqi Police \$ 17.0M

**Narrative Justification:** The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is composed of patrol and station police, as well as specialists in areas such as investigation, forensic and corrections specialists, assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Militia and tribal influence of local police remains a significant problem. Prime Minister Maliki is committed to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with criminal gangs. Training will bring these additional forces up to current standards and methods as part of the total force.

**Impact if not provided:** Police will lack funds critical to resource training and standardization to provide for a reliable, non-sectarian force. While the police force is growing in numbers, they have lost many "seasoned" professionals due to attrition and desertion, therefore the Police Corp lacks some experience gained from whole careers in the law enforcement profession. It will also leave the Iraqi Police dependent upon Coalition Forces to fill the logistical and operational gaps. Not resourcing this critical requirement will leave the Iraqi Police dependent upon Coalition Forces to fill security and operational gaps. Without the appropriate re-training in basic police ethics, weaponry, evidence, criminal investigations, advanced specializations such as forensics, and operations, the Iraq Police will lack the proper education to continue the fight against the insurgency.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Carabinieri-like Training \$ 13.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Carabinieri of Italy are some of the most respected law enforcement professionals in the western world. The goal of this program is to utilize their recognized expertise in law enforcement and counter terrorism as a model for an elite Iraqi police force. Through efforts of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, the Italian Carabinieri will share their training techniques with the Iraqi National Police. Currently there is a two-year plan to train Iraqi National Police leadership, as well as eight to twelve battalions of national police will train at Camp Dublin, close to the Baghdad International Airport. Each course will last three months and will initially be staffed by 40 Carabinieri in training and support roles. Training includes classes on Public Disorder Response (Riot Control), Human Rights, Law Enforcement, Urban Area Patrols, Ambush Training, Detainee Handling Procedures, Fighting in Built up Areas (FIBUA), Rule of Law (Code of Conduct), Natural Disaster (Mass Casualty (MASCAL)/Immediate Response), and Counter Drug Operations.

**Impact if not provided:** Without the capability to train key enablers and eliminate the insurgency, Coalition Forces will remain in theater performing this mission. Eliminating resources for the 8-12 affected battalions will create a critical gap in the fight against insurgents, terrorists and sectarian violence and coercion currently plaguing Iraq. This is a key component to the professionalization of the Iraqi Police Force.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment \$ 58.4M

**Narrative Justification:** The increase of personnel for Iraqi Police units is critical for the achievement of a strong police corps for Iraq. Along with the current Iraqi Police units, there is a need for more specialized training within units. The expansion in units will add personnel with specialized “Special Weapons and Tactics” or SWAT teams. Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordinance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counter-terrorism task force coordination.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource the identified requirement will prevent this needed expansion in police forces. This initiative has the potential to begin the movement towards a unified and united Iraqi Security Force. If the Iraqi units lack critical funds, it will be an impedance to progress and this situation will prevent reduction of reliance on Coalition Forces.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Contract with DoS \$ 400.0M

**Narrative Justification:** These training funds will support the Department of States' Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) training efforts. INL advises USG agencies on developing policies and programs to combat international crime and narcotics. INL support is provided to Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces through MNSTC-I by one of two programs, International Police Trainers (IPT) or International Police Advisors (IPA). IPT's are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to conduct training at police academies throughout Iraq. IPA are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to organize, train, coach, and support Iraqi civil security forces.

The Department of States' Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) advises United States Government agencies on developing policies and programs to combat international crime and narcotics. INL support is currently provided to Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces through MNSTC-I by two programs: International Police Trainers (IPT) and International Police Liaison Officers (IPA). IPT's are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to conduct training at police academies throughout Iraq. IPA's are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to organize, train, coach, and support Iraqi civil security forces. IPT's are currently employed at 11 Police Academies responsible for training recruits entering the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the National Police (NP). IPT's will remain in place to ensure training oversight and "train-the-trainer" programs remain effective and contribute to the legitimacy of the MoI. 690 IPA are currently employed to coordinate efforts with Coalition and Iraqi Civil Security personnel to organize, train, coach, and support 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel, 14 Provincial Chiefs of Police, 58 District Chiefs of Police, and 119 Station Chiefs of Police and staff across 21 key cities in Iraq. In June 2007, the IPA and IPT programs transitioned to a combined International Police Advisors (IPA) program. It is critical to ensure a robust IPA presence remain in Iraq through FY 2008 to assist and ensure that the Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF) can combat international crime and the foreign insurgency. If funds are not provided, Iraqi Police Forces will be degraded and security capabilities will erode before they can mature and become operationally capable, also causing Coalition Forces to remain longer than planned.

**Impact if not provided:** Not resourcing this requirement will leave the Police lacking critical advice from experienced agencies on policy and program development, key to dominate international crime and narcotics. They will also lack training on civilian law enforcement.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Ministerial Capacity, MOI \$ 50.0M

Ministerial Capacity Development (\$50B) is the concentrated effort to develop institutional capabilities at senior Managerial levels within the Ministry of Interior (MoI). US Government partners, led by MNSTC-I's Transition Teams (TTs), specifically focus on building and developing ministerial capabilities in Logistics (maintenance/ supply/ distribution), Personnel, Finance, Contracting and Medical specialties within the Ministry and Subordinate organizational levels. The TT's mission continues to grow and many of the required skill sets are best matched by civilian contractors, especially those with police or police related experience. Currently, twenty-nine contracted subject matter experts are employed and working with the MoI leadership. The contracted support force is expected to grow to more than one hundred and sixty individuals. This requirement continues to develop institutional capabilities at senior managerial levels through the training and consultation of leadership to enhance the ministerial capacity of the MoI. The importance of maintaining the appropriate level of mentorship by highly skilled contractor personnel as the U.S. Military draws-down cannot be overstated. This funding will ensure adequate continuity is maintained as the Iraqi Security Forces transition to self-sufficiency. Outputs include standard policies, formulated strategic plans, and managerial practices and procedures to assist in the Ministry's management processes.

**Impact if not provided:** Without the additional \$50 million, maintenance of institutional capabilities will cease, and the development of the Ministry's senior leaders managing the Iraqi Security Forces will be degraded. The MoI's ability to assume strategic planning and programming responsibilities supporting the on-going Counter-Insurgency (COIN) mission will be delayed which will result in Coalition Forces remaining in place for an additional period of time. The employed contract personnel possess invaluable institutional knowledge regarding police-related activities, governmental procedures, and managerial processes required to ensure successful transition and assumption of governmental roles by MoI leaders and senior managers. If this capability isn't continued, the MoI will have to depend on the Coalition to assume this responsibility.

## **TRAINING EXHIBIT**

### **Training / Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) HQ National Command and Control \$ 3.6M**

**Narrative Justification:** The Ports of Entry allow for the legal, controlled, entry of people and goods into Iraq. The Ports of Entry are an integral source of revenue and a way to track immigration and visitation. Currently, the force is in the process of creating a nationwide database that will help control immigration, track terrorist and criminal activities. Through a cost-sharing, fully funded Sustainment program, all ports around the country will have the capability to ease the flow of trade between Iraq and the rest of the world.

**Impact if not provided:** Even in a peaceful modern country, it is critical to maintain coherent positive control over the borders to adequately manage the entry/exit movements. Without central communication, command and control of these ports, the situation could become a country wide problem if resources aren't efficiently applied. Without a centralized modern central police command and control center, it is impossible for Iraqi police to communicate and control operations and deal with the myriad of threats the Iraqis manage daily.

## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion \$ 16.8M

**Narrative Justification:** Iraq's National Police play an important role in re-establishing law and order in areas of conflict, a task well suited to their purpose, training and capabilities. The current capacity of the MoI to produce police is not sufficient. With the attrition rates the security forces experience on an annual basis, combined with their current rate of new police training, the MoI will not be able to train enough police forces to meet their immediate needs for a number of years. Due to numerous factors, there is ongoing MoI and Coalition planning to expand the training capacity country wide. This involves the expansion of existing facilities to provide additional capacity for up to 15 different training locations. A partnership agreement will enable the Iraqis to build capacity that will allow them to train enough policemen to start the process of transitioning control from Coalition forces.

**Impact if not provided:** Not resourcing this critical requirement will prevent the MoI from providing Policemen with entry level training, which instructs the recruit with basic law enforcement knowledge and skills including problem oriented policing techniques, quality service delivery ideals, and Community Policing concepts which will be put to practical use and reinforced in the field. Furthermore, if this effort is not funded the MoI will not be able to train enough forces to meet their immediate needs for a number of years.



## TRAINING EXHIBIT

### Training / Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment \$ 63.9M

**Narrative Justification:** Increasing Iraqi Police Units is critical in the creation of a unified Iraq. The expansion in units will add personnel which will be similar Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. This funding provides training for the increase in Iraqi Police personnel (currently estimated at 50K across Iraq) with the requisite professional development necessary to safely maintain law and order, to pursue insurgents and militia members and maintain security in their areas of responsibility. In addition, these funds will provide for training which will include apprehension of violent/deranged people, security/VIP searches, military convoy escort, prisoner escorts, searches for missing people/evidence, public order training, public order instructors/ tactical advisors, initial response to suspect explosive devices, police search advisors and coordinators, missing person search management, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear response, pool of authorized firearm officers, high profile, proactive, intelligence-led patrols.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource this training requirement will prevent the extra policemen from having basic police training. This initiative has the potential to cut through the fog of sectarian violence and begin the movement towards a unified and united Iraqi Security Police Corps.

## D. Sustainment

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES:	FY 2008		
	FY 2008	Delta	Amend
<b>Sustainment:</b>	(Dollars in Thousands)		
Retrain Iraqi Police	0	5,600	5,600
Carabinieri-like Training	0	4,000	4,000
Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment	0	66,100	66,100
DBE HQ National Command and Control	0	700	700
Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion	0	2,600	2,600
Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment	0	27,000	27,000
<b>Subtotal, Sustainment</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>106,000</b>	<b>106,000</b>

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Re-train Iraqi Police \$ 5.6M

**Narrative Justification:** The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is composed of patrol and station police, as well as specialists in areas such as investigation, forensic and corrections specialists, assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Militia influence of local police remains a significant problem; some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with criminal gangs. Prime Minister Maliki is committed to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, medical, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, safety, occupational health, protection of critical program information, provisions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year. While the Minister of Interior is responsible for life support and general sustainment, we have programmed up to twelve months of ISFF support for new growth as an incentive for the Government of Iraq assumption of long term costs.

**Impact if not provided:** Not resourcing this requirement will leave the police lacking critical funds to provide for a reliable non-sectarian force. While the police force is growing in numbers, they have lost many "seasoned" professionals and lost the experience gained from whole careers in the law enforcement profession. By not funding this effort, we miss the chance to abbreviate the learning curve that this fledgling force is struggling through. This program will allow the re-training of experienced professionals to bring them up-to-date, provide them with gainful employment and education and stop the cycle of sectarian violence.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Carabinieri-like Training \$ 4.0M

**Narrative Justification:** The Carabinieri police of Italy are some of the most respected law enforcement professionals in the western world. It is the goal of this program to utilize their recognized expertise in law enforcement and counter terrorism as a model for an elite Iraqi police force. Through efforts of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, the Italian Carabinieri will share their training techniques with the Iraqi National Police. These techniques include public disorder response (riot control), human rights, law enforcement, urban area patrols, ambush training, detainee handling procedures, fighting in built up areas, rule of law (code of conduct), natural disaster (Mass Casualty (MASCAL)/immediate response), and counter drug operations. Eight to twelve battalions of Iraqi National Police will train at Camp Dublin, close to the Baghdad International Airport. Each course will last three months and will initially be staffed by about 40 Carabinieri in training and support roles. Funding for this request will help establish the Iraqi National Police as a professional military police force, filling the gap between the police and the armed forces. This program includes a two-year plan to train Iraqi National Police leadership.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, safety, protection of critical program information, and Information Technology. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year.

**Impact if not provided:** Cutting resources for the 8-12 affected battalions will create a critical gap in the fight against insurgents, terrorists and sectarian violence and coercion currently plaguing Iraq. This is an opportunity to take a step forward, past historical limitations and pre-conceived ideals held by many Iraqis in the creation of a professional force willing to uphold the rule of law, and possessing state of the art tools/techniques against an ever adapting and resourceful enemy.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Iraqi Police Expansion, Unit Equipment \$ 66.1M

**Narrative Justification:** The increase of personnel for Iraqi Police units is critical for the achievement of a strong police corps for Iraq. Along with the current Iraqi Police units, there is a need for more specialized training within units. The expansion in units will add personnel with specialized “Special Weapons and Tactics” or SWAT teams. Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordinance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counter-terrorism task force coordination.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the increase of personnel in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as maintenance, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, and safety. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year. While the Minister of Interior is responsible for life support and general sustainment, we have programmed up to twelve months of ISFF support for new growth as an incentive for the Government of Iraq assumption of long term costs.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource the identified requirement will prevent this needed expansion in police forces. This initiative has the potential to begin the movement towards a unified and united Iraqi Security Force. If the Iraqi units lack critical funds, it will be an impedance to progress and this situation will prevent reduction of reliance on Coalition Forces.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) HQ National Command and Control \$ 0.7M

**Narrative Justification:** The Ports of Entry allow for the legal, controlled, entry of people and goods into Iraq. The Ports of Entry are an integral source of revenue and a way to track immigration and visitation. Currently, the force is in the process of creating a nationwide database that will help control immigration, track terrorist and criminal activities. Through a cost-sharing, fully funded Sustainment program, all ports around the country will have the capability to ease the flow of trade between Iraq and the rest of the world.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in the most cost effective manner. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, safety, protection of critical program information, provisions, Information Technology (IT), and interoperability functions. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year. While the Minister of Interior is responsible for life support and general sustainment, we have programmed up to twelve months of ISFF support for new growth as an incentive for the Government of Iraq assumption of long term costs.

**Impact if not provided:** Even in a peaceful modern country, it is critical to maintain coherent positive control over the borders to adequately manage the entry/exit movements. Without central communication, command and control of these ports, the situation could become a country wide problem if resources are not efficiently applied. Without a centralized modern central police command and control center, it is impossible for Iraqi police to communicate and control operations and deal with the myriad of threats the Iraqis manage daily.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Iraqi Police Training Center Expansion \$ 2.6M

**Narrative Justification:** Iraq's National Police play an important role in re-establishing law and order in areas of conflict, a task well suited to their purpose, training and capabilities. The current capacity of the MoI to produce police is not sufficient. With the attrition rates the security forces experience on an annual basis, combined with their current rate of new police training, the MoI will not be able to train enough police forces to meet their immediate needs for a number of years. Due to numerous factors, there is ongoing MoI and Coalition planning to expand the training capacity country wide. This involves the expansion of existing facilities to provide additional capacity for up to 15 different training locations. A partnership agreement will enable the Iraqis to build capacity that will allow them to train enough policemen to start the process of transitioning control from Coalition forces.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the training academies in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as supplies, maintenance, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, safety, protection of critical program information, medical provisions, and Information Technology. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year. While the Minister of Interior is responsible for life support and general sustainment, we have programmed up to twelve months of ISFF support for new growth as an incentive for the Government of Iraq assumption of long term costs.

**Impact if not provided:** Not resourcing this critical requirement will prevent the MoI from providing Policemen with entry level training, which instructs the recruit with basic law enforcement knowledge and skills including problem oriented policing techniques, quality service delivery ideals, and Community Policing concepts which will be put to practical use and reinforced in the field. Furthermore, if this effort is not funded the MoI will not be able to train enough forces to meet their immediate needs for a number of years.

## SUSTAINMENT EXHIBIT

### Sustainment / Iraqi Police Growth, Individual Equipment \$ 27.0M

**Narrative Justification:** The increase of personnel for Iraqi Police is critical for the achievement of a strong police corps for Iraq. Along with the current Emergency Response Units, there is a need for more specialized training within the police units. The expansion in units will add personnel with specialized “Special Weapons and Tactics” or SWAT teams. Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordinance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counter-terrorism task force coordination.

The purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the increase of personnel in the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes life support such as maintenance, transportation, acceptable living conditions, environment, and safety. It also includes the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission throughout the fiscal year. While the Minister of Interior is responsible for life support and general sustainment, we have programmed up to twelve months of ISFF support for new growth as an incentive for the Government of Iraq assumption of long term costs.

**Impact if not provided:** Failure to resource the identified requirement will prevent this from moving forward. If the Iraqi units lack critical funds, it will be an impedance to progress and this situation will prevent reduction of reliance on Coalition Forces.



## VIII. Related Activities - Revised FY 2008 Budget Submission

Although significant progress has been achieved in the last four years, capability gaps have been identified in the ISF. MNF-I and MNC-I, through the Transition Readiness Assessment process and through the reporting of the military transition teams, have validated those capability gaps. These areas of ISF weakness include: lack of maneuver capabilities; tactical mobility and deployability; sustainment; tactical and operational command and control; fire power; reconnaissance and intelligence; survivability; and combat overmatch. Currently, these gaps are satisfied by Coalition Forces. This assessment is supported by a Center for Army Analysis study and other recent capability and force structure reviews. If not addressed, these gaps will require Coalition Forces to remain in support of the counter insurgency fight, or greatly increase the long-term vulnerability of the ISF after redeployment of Coalition tactical and support units. Growing the ISF and implementing recommended adaptations will enable the GOI to assume many Coalition responsibilities by the end of 2008. After extensive research and analysis, the following capabilities have been identified for USG funding, as part of a defined ISF growth package. Funding for the force growth package will be shared between the USG and the GoI.

### Related Activities, BA-3

(Dollars in Thousands)	Original Request	Delta	Revised Request
<b>Detainment Centers Iraqi Corrections Officers</b>	-	<b>+55,400</b>	<b>55,400</b>
<b>TIFRIC Iraqi Corrections Officers</b>	-	<b>+96,400</b>	<b>96,400</b>
<b>Rule of Law Complexes</b>	-	<b>+80,000</b>	<b>80,000</b>
<b>Quick Response Fund</b>	-	<b>+75,000</b>	<b>75,000</b>
<b>TOTAL, RELATED ACTIVITIES</b>	-	<b>+306,800</b>	<b>306,800</b>

## **A. Description of Operations Financed**

Since the beginning of combat operations, the coalition detained individuals who pose a security threat. The rate of captured individuals has significantly out paced the release of personnel with the Baghdad Security Plan and Coalition surge of forces. As the Iraqi Security Forces operate with coalition forces and independently, they too are amassing detainees. Without a change to current detainee operations, the number of detainees will exceed the capacity of current facilities. In order to resolve the near-term and long term problem, a multi-pronged strategy was developed in support of the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan. First, additional Iraqi Corrections Officers (ICOs) are required at existing Coalition detention Centers to assist in guarding the additional detainees as well as to fill vacant billets due to attrition. Second, two Theater Internment Facilities/Reintegration Centers (TIFRICs) are being built closer to capture locations, in order to reduce current detention center populations, prevent overcrowding in current detention facilities and provide a means to educate, rehabilitate and reintegrate reconcilable, moderate detainees. Third, Rule of Law complexes are being developed to expand the capability of the criminal courts of Iraq. These complexes integrate law enforcement and thus make more effective and authoritative Iraqi Security Force efforts to solve crimes, bring insurgents and terrorists to justice, and enforce law and order.

These three courses of action are not solely related to Iraqi Security Forces; however, major components support the ISF or have ISF supported requirements such as the ICOs. For this reason, ISFF are being requested to source ISF requisite portions of each requirement.

Camps Cropper and Bucca are established coalition detainee centers. Numerous initiatives are planned to alleviate identified problems. The ISF component of these changes is focused to increase the number of ICOs at the facilities, build housing for the ICOs while they are on duty, and create the infrastructure to train a sufficient number of ICOs annually to offset attrition. Increasing the number of ICOs is required to support the additional numbers of detainees currently at Bucca and Cropper. Housing the ICOs on the detention center is a force multiplier. The ICOs at Bucca work 5 days in the TIFRIC and have 10 days off; at Cropper, the ICOs work 6 days in the TIFRIC and have 10 days off. Additionally, Camps Bucca and Cropper have transportation and security issues which do not facilitate the ICOs traveling back and forth during their duty time; their presence is a source of intelligence and they are safer not having to travel daily. Building a capacity to train sufficient numbers of ICOs facilitates recruiting from the local community.

The TIFRICs are being built for a three-fold purpose. First is to keep detained persons closer to the location where they were captured; second, increase the overall capacity of coalition detention facilities, and third, provide a method to release reconcilable individuals back into society with basic education and labor skills; thereby, able to work in the economy and be a productive participant in Iraqi society. The ISF component of this requirement is again for ICOs; however, as these are new facilities, the ICOs will be trained elsewhere and then assigned to one of the TIFRICs. The present plan is to build housing for the ICOs on the compound for the same reasons stated for Camps Cropper and Bucca.

Per the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan direction, the proposed rule of law complexes will foster integrated law enforcement and, thus make more effective and authoritative the Iraqi Security Force efforts to solve crimes, bring insurgents and terrorists to justice, and enforce law and order. Humane detention space for arrested suspects confined prior to trial; improved investigations and accountability; and prompt, evenhanded, evidence-based investigations of criminal suspects can enable Iraqis to reject the cycle of revenge and terror, and embrace the rule of law. It is important to emphasize that this is the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) component to the Rule of Law Complexes planned for Mosul, Baqubah, Tikrit, and Basra. The judicial and corrections portions of the Complexes are planned to be funded by Iraqi funding and Foreign Operations appropriations managed by the Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). ISFF will only be used for separate projects in the Complexes that support ISF requirements.

## **B. Detainee Operations - \$231.8M**

### **1. Detainment Centers Iraqi Corrections Officers \$55.4M**

#### **Narrative Justification:**

The Coalition trains and utilizes Iraqi Corrections Officers at current Coalition detention facilities (Bucca and Cropper). Training an additional 3,300 ICO's are required to maintain security as the facilities reach maximum capacity of detainees. Since Cropper and Bucca already have limited training facilities, they have the capability to increase training capacity for ICO recruits to meet maximum capacity requirement (max 30,000 detained personnel) in addition to training replacements to offset projected attrition rates. In order to support the training requirements the facilities must be brought up to the standards required to support the maximum training capacity. Life support contracts for the ICO facilities will provide food, water, electricity, force protection, latrines, camp and vehicle maintenance, housekeeping, fuel, safety & health, supply support, etc. In order to accomplish the initial training and due to the current security situation, the housing is being built on the compounds for the ICOs which will facilitate training, increase their safety and reduce turn-over rates. Services will be phased in as the structure is expanded to meet the increasing detainee population.

The long term solution will be for all Coalition detainees and facilities to be turned over to the Government of Iraq (GOI). The earliest that transfer could be initiated is in late FY 2009, but the transition is dependent on the progress of the Iraqi Government. Effective training of Iraqi personnel in Internment Facility operations will prevent problems and increase the probability of a smooth turn over of detainee operations to the GOI. A Detention Transition Team (DTT) will remain at each facility to monitor detainee operations after the transfer. DTTs will be sourced by Coalition Forces who will continue to coach, mentor, and train the ICOs to prevent problems with Detainee Operations at each facility.

#### **Impact if not provided:**

Insufficient capacity in the Iraqi system to train and equip the Iraqi Correction Officers will preclude present plans to transition this role to the GOI and manage the growing detainee population. The timeline for the GOI to assume responsibility for Detainee Operations will be setback and the United States Government and military forces will require continued resources and conduct military Detainee Operations.

## **2. TIFRIC Iraqi Corrections Officers \$96.4M**

### **Narrative Justification:**

Two Theater Internment Facilities/Reintegration Centers (TIFRICs) are being built at Ramadi and Taji, which at this time will be Coalition-run with Iraqi Corrections Officer (ICO) support. A total of 3,800 ICOs are required for both sites. The central intent of the TIFRICs is to take detainees who can be reconciled to the current political process; provide them basic education and labor skills (brick making, carpentry, etc.); and finally return them to their local communities. This plan establishes a process to reduce the number of detainees under Coalition control and adds skilled labor into the Iraqi economy. Additionally, the TIFRICs will increase the overall capacity of Coalition detention facilities. The initial ICO requirement can not be fulfilled by training ICO's locally at the TIFRIC; therefore, that requirement will be contracted through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). After initial operational capability is attained, each TIFRIC will be able to support ICO training, reducing the cost of production. Life support contracts for the ICO facilities will provide: food, water, electricity, force protection, latrines, camp maintenance, vehicle maintenance, housekeeping, contractor personnel, fuel, safety & health, supply support, etc. In order to satisfy future training requirements and due to the current security situation, housing is being built on the compounds for the ICOs which will facilitate recruitment and training, increase their safety and reduce turn-over rates. The TIFRIC initiative compliments other programs in Iraq. The reintegration portion is critical to enhancing a viable workforce, gaining creditability for the Iraqi Government and maintaining a reduced level of violence.

The long term solution is for all Coalition detainees and facilities to be turned over to the Government of Iraq. The earliest that transfer could be initiated is in late FY 2009, but the transition is dependent on the progress of the Iraqi Government. Effective training of Iraqi personnel in Internment and Reintegration Facility operations will reduce problems and increase the probability of a smooth turn over of detainee operations to the GOI. A Detention Transition Team (DTT) will remain at each facility to monitor Detainee Operations after the transfer. DTTs will be sourced by Coalition Forces who will continue to coach, mentor, and train the ICOs to prevent problems with detainee operations at the facility.

### **Impact if not provided:**

Insufficient Iraqi Correction Officers able to understand and implement reintegration practices when the GOI assumes responsibility. Having the ICO train and work with the Coalition Security guards on a daily basis will instill an understanding of humane treatment of detainees and how to rehabilitate those detainees. Assumptions in planning the TIFRICs included ICO in the guard force total. Unavailability of ISFF to train ICOs will require either a reduction of the maximum planned capacity of

the TIFRIC or additional Coalition Forces to protect and manage the growing detainee population. Additionally the timeline for the Iraqi Government to assume responsibility for Detainee Operations will be setback.

### **3. Rule of Law Complexes Iraqi Security Forces Component \$80.0M**

#### **Narrative Justification:**

This requirement implements the MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan's call for replication of the successful Rusafa Rule of Law Complex model in other Iraqi cities, specifically at two sites for FY 2008. This project will complement other Iraqi Security Force training and equipping efforts to build investigative techniques and skills in a safe environment enabling criminal law enforcement and investigation, free from attacks and intimidation of police and investigators. Although this requirement supports two complexes in FY 2008, proposed site locations include Mosul, Baquba, Tikrit, and Basra where equipment, training and infrastructure will be required. The selection criteria for each site includes (1) security (2) seat of Iraqi civil authority (3) availability of existing infrastructure (4) central location. The Coalition requires \$20M to establish contracts to provide initial support for Iraqi Corrections Officers and Police investigators between the two Rule of Law complexes. Within the planned ISFF funded three-month sustainment transition period, MoI will assume funding responsibilities for sustainment requirements. This model of funding - initial sustainment contracting for a few months before turn over to MOI - has been successfully used in the Rusafa Rule of Law Complex in Baghdad. The total number of ICOs required for the two complexes is 2,500. They will require administrative space and housing. Site locations are being chosen to leverage existing infrastructure for refurbishment in order to minimize construction requirements. Specialized investigative training for 100 police and Iraqi Army investigators with evidence collection and analysis equipment and spaces are also part of the ISF requirement at the complexes.

The expenditures for ISF projects within the planned Rule of Law Complexes provides crucial capacity for police (as well as Iraqi Army units pressed into service fighting insurgent criminals) to investigate and solve crimes free from attack or intimidation as well as to get cases to court and achieve accountability that is seen as legitimate by Iraqis. Like the Rusafa effort, this requirement will build upon and leverage existing Iraqi infrastructure. Representing a pledge of acceptance and commitment, the Rusafa complex recently earned GOI support of \$48.8 million of Iraq funds for operations and maintenance through 31 December 07. Approximately \$110 million is anticipated in the 2008 Iraqi budget.

#### **Impact if not provided:**

This requirement complements other ISF training and equipping efforts by building high-end investigative capacity for police and Army forces, doing police-type work. Unless crimes can be solved so that evidence exposes insurgents as criminals in court, the ISF loses an opportunity to expose insurgents, decrease their popular support, and increase the authority and legitimacy of the government. This should not be confused with various TIFRIC justifications. TIFRICs deal with detention

and reintegration of Coalition captured detainees, which generally would be paid with the other DoD appropriations (e.g., O&M) rather than ISFF.



## **B. Quick Response Fund (QRF) - \$75.0M**

### **Narrative Justification:**

The QRF funding provides Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq the operational flexibility to meet emergent, short-notice requirements in support of the man/train/equip mission, as well as those requirements in direct support of the Multi-National Force-Iraq Joint Campaign Plan.

**Priority funding goes to efforts that support emergent requirements** – Allows the Commander to respond to force protection, facilities repair, communications, equipment, and other needs of the Iraqi Military, Police, Border Enforcement, and Facilities Protection units, such as bonuses to Iraqi Security Forces for heroic acts. These needs, based on local information from commanders in the Multi-National Force, will be time sensitive and cross all regions of Iraq. Purchases that promote regional coordination and joint response to security threats among different Iraqi Security Forces will receive priority, as well as those that promote partnership with the Multi-National Force and tangible, visible progress toward transition of responsibility for security from Coalition Forces to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior.

**Limitation** – In all cases, individual purchases in this effort will be below the simplified acquisition threshold as defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation.